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I. INTRODUCTION 
The law responds to incidents of actual importance and attempts to 
solve real life problems. The field of corporate law is no exception. The 
groundbreaking choices of our modern company law are rooted in the 
needs of business life. For instance, consider the nineteenth-century am-
bition of encouraging investment in expensive projects, such as the con-
struction of railways.1 The decision to grant companies separate legal 
personalities and to introduce limited liability for their shareholders 
stems from this ambition. As a consequence of introducing the concepts 
of legal personality and limited liability, company law attempts to solve 
many problems, including the conflict between the shareholders and the 
creditors of a company.2 
The law must remain adaptive and responsive to the constantly 
changing challenges of our society and our business life. One of the most 
pressing challenges of the past years is the emergence of alternative in-
vestment funds, in particular hedge funds, which masterfully exploit the 
traditional categories of corporate law, financial derivatives, and risk 
management.3 Traditionally, hedge funds tended to trade predominantly 
in financial instruments.4 This practice has changed in recent years, how-
ever. Benefitting from the development of information technology, fu-
tures markets, and the derivatives industry, some hedge funds discovered 
the potentials of equity markets. The ability to actively influence the 
strategy of target companies became an attractive business model for 
them.5 These hedge funds have chosen activism as part of their invest-
ment strategy: they invest in order to be active, and not the reverse. The 
traditional literature characterizes this new strategy as “offensive” activ-
                                                      
 1. On separate legal personality, see Henry Hansmann, Reinier Kraakman & Richard Squire, 
Law and the Rise of the Firm, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1333 (2006); Henry Hansmann & 
Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of Organizational Law, 110 YALE L.J. 387 (2000). On limited 
liability, see Frank Easterbrook & Daniel Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corporation, 52 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 89 (1985); Richard A. Posner, The Rights of Creditors of Affiliated Corporations, 43 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 499 (1976); see also Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Toward Unlimited Shareholder 
Liability for Corporate Torts, 100 YALE L.J 1879 (1991). 
 2. REINIER KRAAKMAN, JOHN ARMOUR, PAUL DAVIES, LUCA ENRIQUES, HENRY HANSMANN, 
GÉRARD HERTIG, KLAUS HOPT, HIDEKI KANDA & EDWARD ROCK, THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE 
LAW 35–37 (2d ed. 2009). 
 3 . On hedge funds generally, see DAVID STOWELL, AN INTRODUCTION TO INVESTMENT 
BANKS, HEDGE FUNDS, AND PRIVATE EQUITY: THE NEW PARADIGM (2010); PETER ASTLEFORD & 
DICK FRASE, HEDGE FUNDS AND THE LAW (2010). 
 4. William Bratton, Hedge Funds and Governance Targets, 95 GEO. L.J. 1375, 1378 (2007); 
Financial Services Authority (FSA), Private Equity: A Discussion of Risk and Regulatory Engage-
ment 26, 30 (FSA Discussion Paper 06/6, 2006). 
 5. See Brian Cheffins & John Armour, The Past, Present and Future of Shareholder Activism 
by Hedge Funds, 37 J. CORP. L. 51 (2011). 
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ism, where activism is part of the investment plan, as opposed to “defen-
sive” activism, where shareholders with a preexisting stake in a company 
are dissatisfied with management and hence are lobbying for change.6 
Internationally, lawmakers and regulators are looking for ways to 
respond to the new, unusual players in the corporate landscape, who have 
emerged by questioning some of the cornerstones of our corporate law. 
One of the strategies of hedge funds, which have become the focus of 
regulators in recent times, is their intentional exploitation of loopholes in 
the legal system to break up the connection between risk and influence in 
shares of their portfolio companies. That is, while a normal shareholder 
would always bear a certain economic risk that corresponds to the size of 
their stake in the company, hedge funds, by contrast, try to disconnect 
the relationship between equity and risk. 
This intentional deconstruction of equity investment can take two 
forms. First, the hedge fund may want to reduce the risk that is usually 
associated with an equity investment. They do this for obvious reasons: a 
shareholder with reduced risk exposure retains its voting power and its 
influence in the company, but it does not bear the risk of negative re-
turns. This strategy is what we may call “negative decoupling.” Second, 
activist investors can attempt to produce the opposite effect: they acquire 
an economic stake in a company without gaining voting power. This may 
be particularly interesting during takeover situations because, under the 
circumstances, current laws only require the disclosure of voting posi-
tions (but not economic exposure).7 Here the economic risk is higher 
than the voting power; we may term this “positive decoupling.”8 
This Article is only concerned with the first of these two forms—
negative decoupling.9  It looks at the various forms of negative risk-
decoupling strategies and tries to shed light on their overall desirability. 
The main approach is functional-comparative in nature, focusing on law 
and economics as well as traditional corporate and financial law scholar-
ship. The jurisdictional focus will be on U.K. and U.S. law, albeit with 
frequent discussions of various continental European jurisdictions. Par-
ticular emphasis will be placed on developing a legislative solution for 
                                                      
 6. See IRIS CHIU, THE FOUNDATIONS AND ANATOMY OF SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM (2010). 
 7. See 2004 O.J. (L 390/38). 
 8. The American scholars Henry Hu and Bernard Black have coined the notions of “empty 
voting” and “hidden ownership” for these two situations. These terms are highly illustrative but can 
be a little misleading and imprecise. See Henry T.C. Hu & Bernard Black, The New Vote Buying: 
Empty Voting and Hidden (Morphable) Ownership 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 811 (2006). 
 9. On the positive decoupling problem, see Maiju Kettunen & Wolf-Georg Ringe, Disclosure 
Regulation of Cash-Settled Equity Derivatives – An Intentions-Based Approach, LLOYD’S MAR. & 
COM. L. Q., 2012, at 227. 
2013] Hedge Funds and Risk Decoupling 1031 
the EU context because the European institutions are currently proposing 
to adopt regulation at the EU level in response to the risk-decoupling 
phenomenon.10 
Three distinct theoretical perspectives are used as an analytical 
framework to examine the vast challenges of risk-decoupling: (1) a clas-
sical agency costs approach; (2) an information costs perspective; and (3) 
a view from corporate finance. This Article argues that shareholders with 
hedged risk exposure do not correspond to the traditional market expec-
tations of shareholders. Corporate law is still widely based on the nine-
teenth-century assumptions of optimal risk alignment and has not fol-
lowed the pace of modern financial engineering opportunities. Risk-
decoupling strategies create both agency and information costs for inves-
tors. Furthermore, they generate challenges for traditional categories of 
corporate finance, aiming to extract the “best of both worlds”—debt and 
equity. 
Based on the insights developed from these policy perspectives, I 
develop regulatory reform proposals, particularly with regard to the EU 
context. Designing an adequate disclosure system is the appropriate and 
most effective remedy for the problems previously identified. Exception-
ally, however, the regulator should be empowered to disenfranchise 
shareholders by imposing voting restrictions. 
II. HEDGE FUND REGULATION AND RISK-DECOUPLING 
The European Union first regulated Hedge Funds extensively with 
the Alternative Investment Funds Managers Directive (AIFM Directive), 
which was adopted in 2011.11 This directive has harmonized the supervi-
sory approach with hedge fund regulation across the EU member states. 
It introduces a comprehensive transparency and admission regime, de-
tailing, inter alia, capital requirements, a maximum of leverage, and an 
independent asset valuation.12 
                                                      
 10. Commission Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 
Amending Directive 2004/109/EC on the Harmonisation of Transparency Requirements in Relation 
to Information About Issuers Whose Securities are Admitted to Trading on a Regulated Market and 
Commission Directive 2007/14/EC, COM (2011) 683 final (Oct. 25, 2011), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/securities/docs/transparency/modifying-proposal/20111025-
provisional-proposal_en.pdf. 
 11. See Council Directive 2011/61 of the European Parliament and of the Council on Alterna-
tive Investment Fund Managers and Amending Directives 2003/41/EC and 2009/65/EC and Regula-
tions (EC) No 1060/2009 and (EU) No. 1095/2010, available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2011:174:0001:0073:EN:PDF. 
 12. Eilís Ferran, After the Crisis: The Regulation of Hedge Funds and Private Equity in the 
EU, 12 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 379, 399 (2011); Dan Awrey, The Limits of EU Hedge Fund Regu-
lation, L. & FIN. MARKETS REV. 119 (2011). 
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Traditionally, hedge funds appeared as dealers only in financial in-
struments.13 However, this changed with the advent of computer technol-
ogy, derivatives exchanges, and financial engineering. A growing num-
ber of hedge funds discovered the possibility of actively influencing the 
management of companies as a business endeavor.14 This is the activity 
that is largely known today as “shareholder activism.”15 
One strategy has recently become the target of regulators and law-
makers worldwide—the artificial decoupling of risk and influence in 
shares of portfolio companies. Using a number of different techniques, 
hedge funds attempt to eliminate or to reduce the economic risk that is 
normally inherently attached to the shares that they buy.16 Some com-
mentators have termed this strategy “empty voting,” referring to a share 
that is freed from its risk but still retains its regular voting entitlement.17 
Hedge funds principally use financial derivatives or share lending strate-
gies to effectuate this result. One newspaper article describes the phe-
nomenon as follows: 
[I]nnovations in the financial markets over the last 30 years have 
created the possibility, and, in fact, the reality, that the link can be 
severed between share ownership and one’s economic interest, 
which leads to an incentive to maximize the value of a corporation 
and its shares. Indeed, capital markets today make it easy to divorce 
share ownership, and the associated voting rights, from any propor-
tionate economic interest in the value of the corporation’s shares. 
This separation can be caused by a multitude of transactions, in the 
form of equity swaps, forwards, futures, puts or calls, all of which 
call into question the fundamental assumption of ‘one share, one 
vote.18 
These strategies touch the core of corporate governance and the tradi-
tional assumptions of share ownership and voting rights. Under the cor-
porate laws of all major jurisdictions, risk and voting rights are necessari-
ly tied together in a bundle of which the share is composed as an invest-
                                                      
 13. Bratton, supra note 4, at 1378; FSA, supra note 4, at 26, 30. 
 14. Eveline Hellebuyck, Activist Hedge Funds and Legal Strategy Devices, in LEGAL STRAT-
EGIES 277 (Antoine Masson & Mary J. Shariff eds., 2010); S. Geraghty & H. Smith, Shareholder 
Activism as a Strategy for Hedge Funds, in HEDGE FUNDS AND THE LAW ch. 8 (Peter Astleford & 
Dick Frase eds., 2010). 
 15. John H. Armour & Brian R. Cheffins, Origins of “Offensive” Shareholder Activism in the 
United States, in ORIGINS OF SHAREHOLDER ADVOCACY 253 (Jonathan GS Koppell ed., 2011). 
 16. Cf. Katayun I. Jaffari & Whitney W. Deeney, One Share, One Vote? Not Necessarily: 
Manipulation of the SEC Proxy System to Effect Empty Voting, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Feb. 25, 
2011, at 7. 
 17. See Hu & Black, supra note 8. 
 18. See Jaffari & Deeney, supra note 16. 
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ment position. This “decomposition” of the legal elements of a share into 
its parts is accompanied by several resulting economic problems: if it is 
possible to separate the risk from the share—or put differently, if the 
share and its voting right remain an empty shell—the hedge fund pursu-
ing such a strategy will no longer exercise the voting right in the way 
exercised by an optimal shareholder with perfect risk alignment. Quite 
the contrary, the hedge fund might ultimately be able to pursue goals that 
are quite opposed or even detrimental to the company’s interests. The 
hedge fund might misuse its control rights to further its own private ben-
efits to the detriment of shareholders and potential investors. 
This scenario exemplifies one of the implications of hedge fund ac-
tivity for the functioning of traditional corporate governance mecha-
nisms. It is clear that hedge funds’ sophistication in exploiting the tradi-
tional categories and tools of corporate governance poses significant 
challenges for regulators and lawmakers. 
Indeed, this is a shortcoming of the AIFM Directive, as it is com-
pletely silent on this aspect of hedge fund activity. The AIFM Directive 
limits itself to rules on the supervision of hedge fund managers; it does 
not pursue an activities-based approach.19 In a similar context, the Treas-
ury Committee of the British House of Commons came to the following 
conclusion: “A fundamental problem with the [AIFM Directive] is that it 
focuses on issues relating to macro-prudential risk, but does not address 
the risks to the real economy caused by the operation of private equity 
and hedge funds.”20 The limitation is surprising for two reasons. First, it 
has traditionally been difficult to find a convincing definition of a “hedge 
fund,” such that every legal rule applicable to a hedge fund raises ques-
tions of legal scope and raises arbitrage opportunities.21 
Second, and more importantly, in numerous situations regulatory 
intervention is not made pursuant to the existence of a given hedge fund 
but rather the concrete market or investment strategy it pursues. Like 
empty voting, any sophisticated market actor may pursue risk decoupling 
strategies, not only a hedge fund. One example concerns the conflict be-
tween carmakers Porsche and Volkswagen in 2008, where Porsche at-
tempted to take over Volkswagen with an opaque strategy using deriva-
                                                      
 19. There are just a few such abstract provisions, in particular, on risk and liquidity manage-
ment. See Alternative Investment Fund Managers (AIFM) Directive, supra note 11, art. 12. 
 20. HOUSE OF COMMONS TREASURY COMMITTEE, BANKING CRISIS: INTERNATIONAL DIMEN-
SIONS, 2008-9, H.C. 615, at Ev 90, available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/ 
pa/cm200809/cmselect/cmtreasy/615/615.pdf. 
 21. See for instance the definition for an “alternative investment fund” in Proposal for a Di-
rective of the European Parliament and of the Council on Alternative Investment Fund Managers, at 
22, COM (2009) 207 final (Apr. 4, 2009). 
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tives and options. According to the press, Porsche acted “very much like 
a hedge fund.”22 
This Article adopts an approach that is distinguishable from the 
AIFM Directive. For the reasons described, it takes an activity-based 
perspective and analyzes the implications of risk decoupling on corporate 
governance. It proposes a regulatory approach that is not limited to hedge 
funds but rather generalizes all market-actors who engage in this strate-
gy. It should be noted that risk-decoupling is only one of many different 
legal strategies that hedge funds pursue, which might warrant further 
study.23 It nevertheless merits a detailed discussion because of its salient 
features and the particular challenges it poses to corporate scholarship. 
The issue of risk decoupling and empty voting has already gained 
much attention by scholars in the United States.24 This Article, however, 
attempts to analyze the problem in the particular governance context of 
the European Union. The objective is to develop concrete regulatory re-
sponses in an effort for a solution in the EU context. 
III. RISK DECOUPLING: EXAMPLES AND PROBLEM ANALYSIS 
Risk decoupling can be instrumentalized in many ways. Three main 
examples include the use of financial derivatives, share lending, and rec-
ord date capture. These activities can all be used either to reduce or to 
eliminate the inherent shareholder risk. Each strategy will be considered 
in turn. 
A. Financial Derivatives 
The first example of a risk-decoupling strategy is the use of finan-
cial derivatives to reduce share risk.25 The financial industry has devel-
oped a number of instruments that hedge shareholder exposure and shift 
the risk to another market participant. To illustrate, we may consider the 
                                                      
 22. See Richard Chang, Porsche: A ‘Hedge Fund With a Carmaker Attached’, N.Y. TIMES 
(Jan. 23, 2009), http://wheels.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/01/23/porsche-a-hedge-fund-with-a-
carmaker-attached; Susanne Preuss, Ein Hedge-Fonds namens Porsche, FRANKFURTER 
ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG (Oct. 29, 2008), http://www.faz.net/aktuell/wirtschaft/unternehmen/vw-
aktien-ein-hedge-fonds-namens-porsche-1711580.html; Dietmar Von Hawranek, Kafka und die 
Cash-Optionen, DER SPIEGEL, Nov. 3, 2008, at 83, available at http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/ 
print/d-61822082.html. 
 23. See, e.g., Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and 
Corporate Control, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1021 (2007). 
 24 . E.g., Shaun Martin & Frank Partnoy, Encumbered Shares, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 775 
(2005); Hu & Black, supra note 8; Henry T.C. Hu & Bernard Black, Equity and Debt Decoupling 
and Empty Voting II: Importance and Extensions, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 625 (2008). 
 25. See Avner Kalay & Shagun Pant, Time Varying Voting Rights and the Private Benefits of 
Control 2, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1556688. 
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example of a simple trader who holds 100 shares of company X plc, trad-
ing at £50 per share. The simplest way to transfer the risk of this long 
position to another market participant would be for the trader to sell the 
shares, using a “future” derivative. These instruments are standardized 
contracts between two parties to exchange a specified number of shares 
for a price agreed today to be delivered at a specified future date. This 
contract would free the trader from the risk in price drop of X plc shares 
since he has already sold them. Nevertheless, he remains shareholder, the 
“owner” of the shares, until he has delivered them to the purchaser. 
On a more sophisticated level, equity swap derivatives can transfer 
the entire risk of share price movements to a transaction counterparty.26 
Imagine two parties to a transaction, A and B, who agree to distribute the 
risk of the share price of X plc as follows. A has to reimburse B for any 
losses that the share price of X incurs over an agreed time period; con-
versely, B has to pay A the equivalent of any gains the X shares make 
during the same time. Under this type of equity swap contract, A is 
called the “long side,” while B is called the “short side”; A bears the 
same risk as if he held the agreed number of X shares, while B’s interest 
is exactly opposite. For our purpose, the most interesting consequences 
emanate where B (the short side) is simultaneously a regular shareowner 
in X with the same amount of shares that are referenced under the swap 
agreement. If this is the case, B will be equally short as long; B’s risk in 
the shares will be entirely eliminated. If the shares increase in value, B 
will have to reimburse the gains to A under the swap agreement, and if 
their value drops, B will be compensated by A for any losses. In other 
words, where a shareholder holds a corresponding short position pursu-
ant to a derivative agreement, he may entirely lose his economic expo-
sure to the shares and become indifferent as to the share price.27 
Theoretically, most derivatives that shift risk onto another party can 
achieve a similar result. For instance, a shareholder may use a short 
call—the sale of a right to purchase—or a long put—the purchase of 
right to sell—to effectuate a similar result. Also, the shareholder could 
simply sell short an amount of shares corresponding to the long side in 
shares they hold. Short selling also creates a short position in shares.28 
                                                      
 26. Hu & Black, supra note 24, at 640. 
 27. It should be noted that the long side of the swap agreement will usually also be interested in 
hedging its position. It can, for instance, short sell a corresponding share position to eliminate its risk 
from the derivative. Id. at 642. 
 28. Henry T.C. Hu & Bernard Black, Hedge Funds, Insiders, and the Decoupling of Economic 
and Voting Ownership: Empty Voting and Hidden (Morphable) Ownership, 13 J. CORP. FIN. 343, 
348 (2007); Roberta Karmel, Voting Power Without Responsibility or Risk: How Should Proxy Re-
form Address the Decoupling of Economic and Voting Rights?, 55 VILL. L. REV. 93, 103 (2010). 
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Finally, it must be noted that the ratio between long and short position 
can even be negative; namely, the holder of a block of shares holds de-
rivatives conferring a negative interest that exceeds the positive expo-
sure. 













Call Right to purchase Short call (Sale 
of a right to 
purchase) 
Long Call 
(Purchase of a 
right to pur-
chase)  
Put Right to sell Long put (Pur-
chase of a right 
to sell)  
Short put (Sale 
of a right to 
sell) 






(A = shareholder, B = bank) 
 
The famous Mylan-Perry case illustrates this concept.29 The case 
relates to an American takeover battle in 2004, in which Mylan Labora-
tories, Inc. sought to acquire King Pharmaceuticals, Inc. An American 
hedge fund, Perry Corp., had a significant ownership stake in King (the 
target) and stood to benefit from the takeover, which offered King share-
holders a 61% premium.30 However, it was unclear whether the takeover 
would benefit Mylan shareholders; in fact, some of the shareholders, in-
                                                                                                                         
This situation became relevant in Deephaven Risk Arb. Trading Ltd. v. UnitedGlobalCom, Inc., No. 
Civ.A. 379-N, 2005 WL 1713067 (Del. Ch. July 13, 2005). Regarding this case, see Michael Lee, 
Empty Voting: Private Solutions to a Private Problem, 2007 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 883, 886 (2007). 
 29. JUAN RAMIREZ, HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE EQUITY DERIVATIVES AND EQUITY CAPITAL 
MARKETS 242 (2011); see also Henry T.C. Hu & Bernard Black, Empty Voting and Hidden 
(Morphable) Ownership: Taxonomy, Implications, and Reforms, 61 BUS. LAW. 1011, 1024 (2006); 
Hu & Black, supra note 8, at 816. 
 30. Hu & Black, supra note 8, at 828. 
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cluding iconic hedge fund manager Carl Icahn, voiced strong concerns.31 
Since the takeover depended on an approving vote by the Mylan share-
holders, Perry began its unusual strategy. It bought 10% of Mylan’s out-
standing shares while intending to vote them in favor of the transaction. 
Perry proceeded to enter swap transactions that hedged risk from any 
potential drop in Mylan’s share price. Technically speaking, Perry took 
the short side of a total return equity swap with third parties, essentially 
banks. These have been described above.32 As Perry referenced as many 
Mylan shares as it had previously bought on the stock market, it was in-
different as to the development of the share price. As a result, Perry 
could vote the Mylan shares in favor of the takeover, without fearing any 
potential economic downside (as other Mylan shareholders) in order to 
realize the value from the takeover as a King shareholder.33 
The transaction was never consummated for unrelated reasons.34 In 
2009, the Securities and Exchange Commission announced a settlement 
agreement with Perry over the question of whether the hedge fund cor-
rectly disclosed its accumulation of nearly 10% in Mylan shares.35 This 
settlement, however, only concerned the question of disclosure of the 
long position, and it did not address the wider question of risk decou-
pling. Pursuant to the settlement, Perry paid a $150,000 fine without ad-
mitting any wrongdoing.36 Another well-known case is the transaction 
between Stark and M-Flex, which will, however, not be reiterated here.37 
Furthermore, it should be noted that a total elimination of the risk, 
as in the Mylan-Perry case, is certainly an exceptional situation. But it 
does not seem implausible that derivatives are more often used by hedge 
funds to produce, at the very least, a partial reduction of the risk. The 
SEC’s investigation into the Mylan-Perry case discussed “merger arbi-
trage,” a common behavior of hedge funds during the advancement of 
corporate takeovers.38 It should be noted that the decoupling effect of 
                                                      
 31. Id. 
 32. See supra text accompanying note 26. 
 33. Hu & Black, supra note 8, at 828. 
 34. Id. at 829. 
 35. See In the Matter of Perry Corp. Respondent, Exchange Act Release Nos. 2907 & 60351, 
2009 WL 2163550 (July 21, 2009). 
 36. Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges Perry Corp. with Disclosure Viola-
tions in Vote Buying Scheme (July 21, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/ 
2009/2009-165.htm. 
 37. Hu & Black, supra note 28 at 349; Hu & Black, supra note 24, at 634. 
 38. In the Matter of Perry Corp. Respondent, Exchange Act Release Nos. 2907 & 60351, 2009 
WL 2163550, at *3 (July 21, 2009). 
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derivatives may also be purely temporary in character.39 Unlike tradi-
tional deviations from the “one share one vote” standard, such as multi-
ple voting shares, derivative contracts allow hedge funds to construct 
economically similar results selectively in certain well-timed situations.40 
A more typical activity for risk-eliminating or risk-reducing trans-
actions is hedging transactions of management or other senior employees 
of the company. Using so-called “collar transactions” or “executive equi-
ty swaps,” an investor can, for example, sell a call option at a certain 
strike price and purchase a put option at a lower exercise price.41 For a 
relatively low price, an investor can in this way limit the potential appre-
ciation or depreciation of their long shares, within a range (of a collar) 
between the two prices. Empirical studies have shown that management 
and senior personnel use these structures often to avoid or to reduce the 
risk exposure of an equity stake they hold.42 Thus, economically speak-
ing, it amounts to a countermeasure against the efforts in recent years to 
introduce variable components into executive remuneration: stock option 
plans, employee share-based programs, and other schemes have become 
popular to better align the interests of management and shareholders and 
to incentivize management to take on more risk.43 This type of hedging 
transaction is particularly problematic when managers engage in the 
practice because the managers may possess insider information. They 
can use the transaction, in addition to a hedge in their equity stake, to the 
detriment of shareholders. 
B. Share Lending 
Share lending can be used to create risk-decoupled long positions. 
The notion of “share lending” is slightly misleading, however, because it 
describes a transaction where securities are not simply “lent” and then 
retransferred. Rather, one party transfers the ownership of numerous se-
curities to another and, at a later time, receives a corresponding number 
                                                      
 39. This is emphasized by Avner Kalay and Shagun Pant, Time varying voting rights and the 
private benefits of control (Working Paper, November 2009). 
 40. See id. 
 41. See Paul Bolster, Don Chance & Don Rich, Executive Equity Swaps and Corporate Insider 
Holdings, 25 FIN. MGMT., No. 2, 1996, at 14. 
 42. See J. Carr Bettis et al., Managerial Ownership, Incentive Contracting, and the Use of 
Zero-Cost Collars and Equity Swaps by Corporate Insiders, 36 J.L. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE 
ANALYSIS 345 (2001); Lucian Bebchuk & Jesse Fried, Executive Compensation as an Agency, 17 J. 
ECON. PERSP. 71 (2003); see also Concept Release on the U.S. Proxy System, Securities Act Release 
No. 3052, 2010 WL 2779423 (July 14, 2010). 
 43. See Kevin J. Murphy, Explaining Executive Compensation: Managerial Power versus the 
Perceived Cost of Stock Options, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 847 (2002). 
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of shares in return (though not necessarily the identical shares).44 The 
transaction can also be structured as a “repurchase agreement,” where 
shares are sold and later repurchased. Both structures can be used for a 
variety of purposes, including hedging and speculation. Most commonly, 
borrowers use them for short selling: borrowers are betting on falling 
share prices and sell shares that they does not own, hoping to obtain them 
later at a cheaper price. The International Corporate Governance Net-
work (ICGN) emphasizes the beneficial role of share lending in its Code 
of Best Practice.45 According to the guidelines, securities lending in-
creases market liquidity, reduces the risk of failed transactions, and sig-
nificantly increases the returns of investors.46 
Securities lending can, however, also be used to effectuate risk-
decoupling strategies. It is crucial to understand that the legal structure 
necessarily implies a transfer of ownership between the lender and the 
borrower. This transfer of ownership indeed corresponds to the interests 
of the parties, as a securities lending transaction is intended to temporari-
ly transfer the securities to the borrower while allowing him to use them 
commercially. It follows that the borrower also acquires the voting right, 
which is attached to the share.47 This stands in stark contrast to the expo-
sure felt from the consequences of the voting decision, which will affect 
the lender once the shares have been retransferred to him. The lender 
remains the “beneficial” owner, that is, the person bearing the conse-
quences of the share price development and the actor economically inter-
ested in the share. Thus, the borrower acquires temporary ownership in 
the shares but does not feel the economic consequences of this owner-
ship. Strategic investors have discovered and exploited this fact in the 
                                                      
 44. See INT’L SEC. LENDING ASS’N, GLOBAL MASTER SECURITIES LENDING AGREEMENT ¶ 1.1 
(2010). 
 45. See INT’L CORP. GOVERNANCE NETWORK, SECURITIES LENDING CODE OF BEST PRACTICE 
(2007), available at https://www.icgn.org/files/icgn_main/pdfs/best_practice/sec_lending/ 
2007_securities_lending_code_of_best_practice.pdf. 
 46. Id. at 3. 
 47. See Paolo Santella et al., A Comparative Analysis of the Legal Obstacles to Institutional 
Investor Activism in the EU and in the US 27 (2009) (working paper), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1137491; MAZARS & MARCCUS PARTNERS, TRANSPARENCY DIRECTIVE 
ASSESSMENT REPORT – PREPARED FOR THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION INTERNAL MARKET AND 
SERVICES DG, FINAL REPORT 124 (2009), available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/secur 
ities/docs/transparency/report-application_en.pdf; MARK C. FAULKNER, SECURITIES LENDING & 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 5 (2005), available at http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/markets/Docu 
ments/gilts/slcgjun05.pdf; EUROPEAN SEC. MKTS. EXPERT GRP. (ESME), FIRST REPORT OF ESME 
ON THE TRANSPARENCY DIRECTIVE (TD) 6 (2007), available at http://ec.europa.eu/inter 
nal_market/securities/docs/esme/05122007_td_report_en.pdf; THOMAS KEIJSER, FINANCIAL 
COLLATERAL ARRANGEMENTS: THE EUROPEAN COLLATERAL DIRECTIVE CONSIDERED FROM A 
PROPERTY AND INSOLVENCY LAW PERSPECTIVE: AN ACADEMIC ESSAY IN LAW 148 (2006). 
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way some have used share borrowing to acquire temporary voting influ-
ence in a company or to temporarily cross a certain share threshold and 
quota. In particular, there is a danger that a borrower might vote the bor-
rowed shares at a general meeting, where the lender will bear the eco-
nomic consequences. Consequently, the ICGN Code also mentions the 
risks attached to a misuse of the voting right by the borrower.48 Accord-
ing to the ICGN, this situation can lead to cases of shares being voted by 
parties who have no equity capital at risk in the issuing company and 
thus no long-term interest in the company’s welfare. ICGN therefore 
calls for a clear lending policy at institutional investors.49 
The problem may be illustrated by the following quote: 
The insurers’ and pension funds’ trade bodies have underlined that 
next month’s annual meeting of Mitchells & Butlers will be a cliff-
hanger, by urging members to call back lent stock and to refuse to 
lend it out. They fear borrowers may not vote the shares, or vote 
them in a way that the shareowners later regret.50 
In view of the potential abuse or misuse of voting rights following share 
lending, the ICGN states: 
[I]t is bad practice to borrow shares for the purpose of voting. Lend-
ers and their agents, therefore, should make best endeavours to dis-
courage such practice. Borrowers have every right to sell the shares 
they have acquired. Equally the subsequent purchaser has every 
right to exercise the vote. However, the exercise of a vote by a bor-
rower who has, by private contract, only a temporary interest in the 
shares, can distort the result of general meetings, bring the govern-
ance process into disrepute and ultimately undermine confidence in 
the market.51 
In the United Kingdom, the former City Minister Lord Paul Myners 
pointed out the problem in his various reports of share voting from 2004–
2007.52 These documents highlight the need to demonstrate to lenders the 
consequences of share-lending transactions on the voting right. It be-
comes clear in this appeal that not all lenders are apparently aware of the 
                                                      
 48. INT’L CORP. GOVERNANCE NETWORK, supra note 45, at 3. 
 49. Id., at 5. 
 50. Andrew Hill, Neither a Borrower . . ., FIN. TIMES, Dec. 18 2009, at 18. 
 51. INT’L CORP. GOVERNANCE NETWORK, supra note 45, at 3. 
 52. See PAUL MYNERS, REVIEW OF THE IMPEDIMENTS TO VOTING UK SHARES (2004) [herein-
after MYNERS, REVIEW]; PAUL MYNERS, REVIEW OF THE IMPEDIMENTS TO VOTING UK SHARES: AN 
UPDATE ON PROGRESS (2005) [hereinafter MYNERS, UPDATE ON PROGRESS]; PAUL MYNERS, 
REVIEW OF THE IMPEDIMENTS TO VOTING UK SHARES: AN UPDATE ON PROGRESS THREE YEARS ON 
(2007) [hereinafter MYNERS, UPDATE THREE YEARS ON]. 
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fact that they are not just lending the share but also the voting right. 
Overall, Lord Myners advocated a necessary balance between the signif-
icant position of the voting right and the economically useful exchange 
of securities via lending transactions.53 
In recent years, several strategies in securities lending—for the pur-
pose of risk reduction and managerial influence—have been recognized. 
To illustrate, a few real world cases will be discussed as follows. 
In the Lindner case, “borrowed” shares were used for the purpose 
of a “squeeze-out” in a German partnership. Both the founder and gen-
eral partner of a limited partnership, along with another shareholder, 
transferred, by way of a loan, their limited shares totaling 33.5% to a 
shareholder who already held 62.59% of the limited partnership. The 
loan agreements provided that an annual fee was to be paid and, during 
the term of the loan, the equivalent of all dividends would be reimbursed 
to the lenders. The borrower, whose stake had thus grown to 95%, then 
demanded the implementation of a squeeze-out procedure in accordance 
with §§ 327a-327f of the German Aktiengesetz.54 Minority shareholders 
challenged the transaction on legal grounds.55 They were ultimately not 
successful; the German Supreme Court held that the accumulation of a 
95% stake as required for the squeeze-out by way of a securities borrow-
ing structure does not amount to an abusive or otherwise illegal proce-
dure.56 Therefore, the activity did not trigger legal nullity or voidability 
of the resolution.57 This judgment is based on a formal approach that fo-
cuses only on the legal ownership of the principal shareholder of the 
shares in question (and not deviating shareholder agreements).58 
Another example can be found in the British Land case.59 Shortly 
before a British real estate and investment company held its general 
meeting, the hedge fund Laxey Partners disclosed that it had more than 
                                                      
 53. MYNERS, UPDATE THREE YEARS ON, supra note 52, at 9. 
 54. This requires 95% of the shares. 
 55. Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice], Mar. 16, 2009, ENTSCHEIDUNGEN 
DES BUNDESGERICHTSHOFES IN ZIVILSACHEN [BGHZ] 180, 154 (Ger.). 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. The lower instance courts, by contrast, had held that the squeeze out resolution was 
void. 
 58. For comments on the decision, see Mark S. Rieder, Kein Rechtsmissbrauch beim Squeeze-
out, ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR UNTERNEHMENS- UND GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT [ZGR] 981 (2009) (Ger.); 
Sebastian Goslar & Klaus von der Linden, Grenzen des Rechtsmissbrauchseinwands gegen 
Gestaltungen beim Aktienrechtlichen Squeeze out BETRIEBS-BERATER [BB] 1986 (2009) (Ger.). On 
the decision by the Munich court of appeal, see Christoph Kumpan & Martin Mittermeier, 
Risikoentleerte Stimmrechte – Auswirkungen von Wertpapierdarlehen im Gesellschaftsrecht 
ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT (ZIP) 404 (2009) (Ger.). 
 59. RAMIREZ, supra note 29, at 240; Norma Cohen, Laxey Partners Increases British Land 
Stake to 9%, FIN. TIMES, July, 16, 2002 at 23. 
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tripled its equity stake from 2.9% to 9.0% within a few days. The general 
meeting was to, inter alia, decide on a proposed change in management 
and a share buyback program.60 As a consequence, the general meeting 
ended in disagreement. While most other participants considered the 
strategy of Laxey a violation of good corporate governance, Laxey’s po-
sition was that it would act as an advocate for all shareholders and effec-
tively control the company’s management.61 Ultimately, Laxey’s position 
did not succeed, but the case nevertheless caused a stir and demonstrated 
the possible extent of voting manipulation by borrowed shares. Further-
more, the shift in Laxey’s shares allowed the latter to significantly 
strengthen its position within the circle of shareholders, for instance, by 
being given the option to convene an extraordinary general meeting.62 
The particular irony of the case was that prominent institutional inves-
tors, such as Hermes, were among the lenders; Hermes knew nothing of 
its role in facilitating the rebellious action of Laxey. Hermes, who is a 
leader and supporter of corporate governance standards, later apologized 
to British Land.63 
The merger between the British cruise line P&O Princess Cruises 
plc and the American travel company Carnival Corporation later con-
firmed these fears. Discussions during the extraordinary general meeting 
of P&O Princess, which had to decide on whether to accept the restruc-
turing, revealed that many shares were borrowed by activist shareholders 
and that the borrowers might have voted against the wishes of the long-
term investors.64 There were also fears that some borrowers would tender 
the shares to Carnival as part of its partial takeover offer, again displac-
ing the long-term investors.65 This case has led to considerable legal and 
political debate. Various reform proposals were considered, including a 
change in the content of standard borrowing agreements, or the introduc-
tion of a prohibition on the borrowing shares for the purpose of exercis-
ing the voting rights.66 There was a fear, however, that these extensive 
changes would lead to market disruptions. Finally, the only successful 
change was a modification of the voluntary Stock Borrowing and Lend-
                                                      
 60. RAMIREZ, supra note 29; Cohen, supra note 59. 
 61. Hu & Black, supra note 8, at 834. 
 62. Cohen, supra note 59. 
 63. John Waples, Ritblat Hits at CSFB and Laxey for Vote ‘Conspiracy,’ SUNDAY TIMES, July 
21, 2002, at 1; see also Hu & Black, supra note 60, at 834. 
 64. Stock Lending & Repo Comm., Summary of Meeting Held at the Bank of England ¶ 3 
(Dec. 11, 2002). 
 65. See Susan Christoffersen et al., Vote Trading and Information Aggregation, 62 J. FIN. 
2897, 2901 (2007). 
 66. Stock Lending & Repo Comm., supra note 64, at ¶ 4. 
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ing Code of Guidance, a best practice code for securities lending. This 
code now states: 
C.7.4 A person could borrow shares in order to be able to exercise 
the voting rights and influence the voting decision at a particular 
meeting of the company concerned. There is a consensus, however, 
in the market that securities should not be borrowed solely for the 
purpose of exercising the voting rights at, for example, an AGM or 
EGM. Lenders should also consider their corporate governance re-
sponsibilities before lending stock over a period in which an AGM 
or an EGM is expected to be held. Beneficial owners need to ensure 
that any agents they have made responsible for voting and for secu-
rities lending act in co-ordinated way.67 
The Code is not binding law, but the reform is intended to send a strong 
signal to market participants that these practices will not be tolerated. 
The discussion raises a variety of follow-up questions. In particular, 
it begs the question of how often the strategy of securities lending in 
practice actually occurs or may likely occur. Second, and closely related, 
is the questionable role of the securities lender in this type of transaction. 
Intuitively, one might think that a lender who knows the intentions of the 
borrower, or guesses them, will simply refrain from entering into the 
transaction or take precautions accordingly. In short, questions relate to 
the significance of this approach at a practical level and the concrete in-
terests of the parties involved. 
1. Restrictions 
The seemingly effortless use of securities lending transactions, as in 
the examples described above, is subject to significant practical limita-
tions when these transactions occur. In attempting to pursue such a strat-
egy, a borrower faces the most obvious difficulty of a recall clause, 
which often appears in security lending agreements. Most of the popular 
framework agreements for lending securities include a standard clause 
for any type of early termination of the individual lending. Most interna-
tional securities lending transactions are made on the basis of the Global 
Master Securities Lending Agreement (GMSLA).68 This is published by 
the industry group International Securities Lending Association (ISLA), 
                                                      
 67. BANK OF ENG., SECURITIES BORROWING & LENDING CODE OF GUIDANCE 18 (2009), 
available at http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/markets/gilts/stockborrowing.pdf; see also Stock 
Lending & Repo Comm., supra note 64, at ¶ 4. 
 68. Kingsley T.W. Ong & Eugene Y.C. Yeung, Repos & Securities Lending: The Accounting 
Arbitrage and Their Role in the Global Financial Crisis, 6 CAPITAL MKTS. L.J. 92, 93 (2011). 
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and the current version dates from 2010.69 Paragraph 8.1 of this docu-
ment sets out the lender’s right to terminate a loan of securities. Subject 
to any terms of the relevant loan, for example, where a fixed period has 
been agreed, the lender may terminate the agreement by giving notice 
equal to the standard settlement time for the securities concerned, and the 
borrower must redeliver the shares by the end of this period. As other 
master agreements contain similar clauses, in practice, most borrowing 
contracts include a right of termination or a call-back option. Whether 
such a right of revocation or termination is also realized, however, is an-
other question. Practitioners point out that most borrowers are looking to 
avoid a recall of loaned securities. A frequent exercise of the recall op-
tion could accordingly render the lending business much less attractive 
for borrowers.70 Meanwhile, market observers report that most securities 
are recalled only in exceptional circumstances, such as before a takeover 
or in the event of serious cost concerns.71 
Practitioners familiar with the market point out a second issue. It is 
often not easy to pile up a large block of shares simply through borrow-
ing shares.72 This is especially true at a general meeting when an im-
portant decision is on the agenda, in particular, the decision of reorgani-
zation or other transactions because these plans often wake up other ac-
tivist shareholders and arbitrageurs, which reduces the availability of 
borrowable shares in the market. 
A third consideration is the cost side. The borrowing of shares may 
indeed often be possible at relatively low cost,73 but in practice, high se-
curity payments are to be made to the lender, who is naturally unwilling 
to bear the default risk of the borrower.74 In the case of Laxey and British 
Land, the security provided amounted to about 105% of the market value 
of the shares and was therefore even above the actual purchase price.75 
The requirement to provide security at this level can pose major obsta-
cles for many potential borrowers. 
                                                      
 69. See INT’L SEC. LENDING ASS’N, supra note 44. 
 70. MARK FAULKNER, AN INTRODUCTION TO SECURITIES LENDING 49 (4th ed. 2007) (“Recalls 
are part and parcel of the securities lending business. However, borrowers seek to avoid recalls 
wherever possible and frequent recalls may discourage borrowers from accessing portfolios. In prac-
tice the lenders, or their agent, communicate the lender’s position with regards to voting to the bor-
rowers so as to avoid any surprises.”). 
 71. Santella et al., supra note 47, at 29, In addition, a more frequent exercise of the right to 
recall lent shares would not even be desirable, as this could significantly reduce market liquidity. See 
ESME, supra note 47, at 7. 
 72. RAMIREZ, supra note 29, at 241. 
 73. See Christoffersen et al., supra note 65. 
 74. RAMIREZ, supra note 29, at 242. 
 75. Id. at 240. 
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Finally, both strategic marketing issues and the reputation of the 
borrower are to be considered. If the borrowing strategy becomes known 
in the market, the seriousness of the investor is jeopardized. Equally, his 
reputation and commitment to the welfare of the investment may be in 
doubt.76 In a similar vein, sophisticated models of game theory or simply 
common sense suggest that lenders will not enter into similar lending 
transactions with the borrower a second time if they suffered from an 
abusive exercise of the voting right; alternatively, lenders will, at the 
very least, price-in the risk and seek to negotiate a compensation for the 
possible losses of value in his investment. 
2. The Lender’s Interests 
All of the discussed considerations are largely invalidated, howev-
er, when taking into account the motivations and incentives of the lender. 
Three factors seem to be particularly salient. 
First, the lender will almost never make the decision about a specif-
ic rental transaction separately; the preparation and execution of the con-
tract is carried out in most cases by central depositors who bring together 
supply and demand on a case by case basis, but also automatically in ac-
cordance to standard contracts. 
This aspect is not resolved by the fact that the lender is usually a 
sophisticated institutional investor.77  Even in these circumstances, we 
expect that they themselves benefit from the rental fee, and as long as the 
other shareholders do not lend out their shares, the possible abuse of their 
voting rights by the borrower is unlikely.78 This mirrors the basic prob-
lem of collective action that we know from share voting—when it comes 
to lending out shares, the same issue of free-riding can be noticed. A 
more charitable account would argue that institutional investors will al-
ways balance the fees they obtain from lending, on the one hand, with 
the cost of a recall and an informed exercise of their voting rights on the 
other.79 However, an early recall of the shares will usually carry an over-
                                                      
 76. Id. at 242. 
 77. Hu & Black, supra note 8, at 897. 
 78. Id. at 896. But see Reena Aggarwal, Pedro Saffi & Jason Sturgess, The Role of Institutional 
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all additional cost in such a calculation. The risk of abuse seems to be so 
remote and abstract that it typically is not incorporated as a relevant fac-
tor in the cost consideration. One fund manager has described the con-
flict as follows: “The problem is that the corporate governance implica-
tions cannot be easily costed, but lending can.”80 Therefore, it is not sur-
prising that, in practice, an overall recall of lent shares occurs very rare-
ly.81 
Second, a significant problem exists during the voting of important 
projects because investors are not timely informed.82 Particularly under 
U.S. law, in the context of convening a general meeting, documentation 
and notice requirements appear in moments of unfavorable timing. Of-
ten, the lender does not have sufficient time to recall the shares. But even 
when timing is not an issue, it is uncertain whether the lender will actual-
ly call back the shares. The lender may only do so if: (1) the “right” deci-
sion makers—those within the internal structure of the investment 
fund—become aware of the important weight attached to the vote; and 
(2) these decision makers convince other decision makers involved in the 
same internal structure that a decision to recall the shares is necessary.83 
Moreover, those existing incentives in the internal fund structure of the 
lending institutions may turn out to be problematic. For example, some 
funds pay their fund managers exclusively out of the fees that stem from 
securities lending transactions and provide no additional salary.84 For 
these fund managers, their personal income depends on the fund’s lend-
ing volume—the consequences of this arrangement do not require further 
explanation. 
The circumstances change when the lender is a small investor or 
individual. Here, the investors often already lack the knowledge of their 
shares being lent out (it is often carried out by a custodian or intermedi-
                                                                                                                         
ship will be evaluated to determine an optimal amount, if any, of a company’s loaned securities that 
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 83. Id. 
 84. Simon Wong, Barriers to Effective Investor Engagement, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2012, at 6. 
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ary). Even if the investor is aware of the transaction, however, the prob-
lem of rational apathy of dispersed investors aggravates the conflict. As 
we know from the broad exercise of voting rights, the relationship be-
tween vote and benefit is often so unfavorable for retail investors that the 
rational investor will not seriously engage in calculating the value of his 
voting right and other rental options.85 
Given these various incentives, it is not surprising that only a tiny 
fraction of all shares on loan are being recalled. Empirical studies esti-
mate the proportion of recalled shares to be no more than 2% of all lent 
shares.86 
3. Particular Incentives Within Index Funds 
In addition to these basic problems, index funds exacerbate the in-
centives in favor of lending. Index funds are simple mutual funds that 
mimic a specific, representative index (such as FTSE 100 or Dow Jones) 
as accurately as possible. These funds are popular with investors because 
fees are usually quite low in comparison to actively managed funds, 
which charge extra management fees. To achieve their aim, index funds 
invest in the securities underlying the index in the same proportion as the 
index. Other funds use derivatives (swaps) to bind the fund’s perfor-
mance to the index.87 In 2012, about $3 trillion was invested in index 
funds.88 
The indexing of investment transposes findings from the efficient 
market hypothesis89 and modern portfolio theory90 into a simple invest-
ment strategy. In its moderate form, the efficient market hypothesis holds 
that financial markets are efficient in the sense that, at the very least, all 
information publically available is already priced in the securities.91 With 
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new information immediately and fully priced in, no one, except insiders, 
is able to achieve lasting above-market profits. Following this logic, in-
vestors should not try to systematically outperform the market; they 
should instead rely on a predefined index. On this basis, modern portfo-
lio theory recommends that investors solve just a single optimization 
problem—to choose the market portfolio, which corresponds best to their 
own maximization of preferences.92 In practice, this is best represented 
by a predefined index, such as the Dow Jones. 
In today’s financial markets, the success of the indexing strategy is 
best illustrated by the advent of exchange-traded funds (ETFs).93 These 
funds are similarly traded like securities on the stock market. Indeed, 
they imitate a particular index such as the FTSE 100 or the Dow Jones, 
and in more recent times, they also use bond or commodity indices. For 
investors, the low costs are of a particular advantage because the man-
agement fee of index funds is usually less than 0.3%. For actively man-
aged funds, the costs are almost always between 1.5% and 3%, some-
times even more. These higher fees may be understandable given the 
fund manager’s quality of work. For actively managed funds, the fund 
managers observe the markets and decide which securities are bought or 
sold. An index fund such as the ETF is passively managed, however. It 
only has to reflect the performance of the corresponding index. Changes 
must be made only if the index is adjusted or its contents are modified.94 
The administrative costs of index funds can be further reduced 
where the fund lends out its portfolio securities to other market partici-
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 92. See Tobin, supra note 90. 
 93. The ETF industry has grown over the past years by about 40% per year and administers a 
capital of almost $1.5 trillion. More recently, experts have emphasized the systemic risks that may 
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ils” Investment: Exchange Traded Funds, FIN. TIMES, June 6, 2011, at 7; see also FIN. STABILITY 
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r_110412b.pdf. This critique has, however, in no way included the funds’ popularity. See Da-
vid Ricketts, Traditional Index Funds Lose to ETFs, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2012, at 9. 
 94. See William M. Humphries, Leveraged ETFs: The Trojan Horse Has Passed the Margin-
Rule Gates, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 299, 301 (2010) (discussing in detail the various characteristics 
of ETFs). 
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pants temporarily. This strategy is widely popular in practice.95 Some 
funds allegedly make more profits with the fees they obtain for the loans 
than with their traditional fund fees.96 As explained, many titles will be 
held for long periods of time in the portfolio passively and not traded. 
For these titles, funds are tempted to improve the return of their portfolio 
by lending them out instead of keeping them useless in their portfolio. 
Fund managers use the generated fees to further reduce the overall costs 
of the fund and thus improve their competitive standing.97 
The temporary transfer of these portfolio securities to other market 
players happens regularly without the option of retransferring for the 
general meeting.98 Even if such an option existed, there is no incentive 
for fund managers to make use of it; the strategic objective of the index 
fund is to reflect the underlying index as closely as possible—not to out-
perform nor influence it. The fund therefore has no interest in exercising 
its voting rights, which in turn increases its willingness to temporarily let 
go of the securities over and including the record date and the annual 
general meeting. Where an investor borrows shares of a portfolio com-
pany against a fee, in order to actively influence the strategy of the com-
pany, it will only be advantageous for the index fund. In this way, the 
index fund achieves a double advantage: it receives the rental fee, and it 
benefits from the actions of an activist (borrowed) shareholder, which, in 
the optimal case, has a positive influence on the strategy of the manage-
ment. This situation has important implications for the ability of third 
parties to borrow securities for the sole purpose of voting. 
In other words, for a manager of an index fund, the performance of 
the target company is ultimately irrelevant, and all that counts is the ex-
act mapping of the index. Given the choice of exercising voting rights in 
a particular company or passing them to other hands against a fee, the 
manager will always choose the latter option. 
Studies have shown that predominantly large, passive institutional 
investors, whose investment targets are well-known publicly held com-
                                                      
 95. Many funds lend out up to 25% of their portfolio shares. See Niels Nauhauser, Index-ETFs 
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e-01-september-2011.pdf. 
 96. FIN. STABILITY BD., supra note 93, at 4–5. 
 97. On possible conflicts of interests, see Paula Niall & Pauline Skypala, Regulatory Spotlight 
Turns on Lending Business, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2012, at 8. 
 98. INT’L CORP. GOVERNANCE NETWORK, SHARE LENDING VIS-À-VIS VOTING 14 (2004). 
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panies, are the ones who lend out shares.99 Given the reduced probability 
of a recall, borrowers prefer these types of investors as business part-
ners.100 Also, tax incentives increase the likelihood of passive funds in 
the lending business.101 
Overall, the current market situation seems to virtually invite par-
ties to borrow shares “for free” and to use them for their own independ-
ent purposes. In any case, the lender usually has little or no motivation to 
control the exercise of its voting shares or the timing of recalling them 
back. 
C. Record Date Capture 
A third phenomenon of negative risk decoupling is the strategy of 
“record date capture.” It is somehow connected to securities lending, but 
it can be considered as a separate category that includes distinct prob-
lems and implications. Most jurisdictions worldwide have introduced a 
system where there is a cut-off date to register for the general meeting. 
The date is some time before the meeting actually takes place. Hedge 
funds may exploit the divergence between the record date and the date of 
the general meeting in order to produce a situation resembling a risk-
decoupled shareholder. 
The strategy is simple. The decisive day determines which share-
holders are entitled to vote at the general meeting. Because there is nec-
essarily a certain divergence between the record date and the date of the 
general meeting, the strategy allows for the situation that the actual vot-
ers at the meeting are not necessarily at the same time current sharehold-
ers. This creates the possibility for nonunified shareholder decision-
making and risk exposure. While smaller, unintentional deviations are to 
be accepted as inherent features of the system, larger deviations can be 
deliberately exploited and manipulated by knowledgeable market actors 
for their own purposes. 
1. The Record Date System 
A “record date” refers to the date that designates the shareholders 
entitled to vote at the general meeting.102 Most jurisdictions set such a 
                                                      
 99. See D’Avolio, supra note 86. 
 100. See id. 
 101. See id. 
 102. Commission Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of The Council on 
the Exercise of Voting Rights by Shareholders of Companies Having Their Registered Office in a 
Member State and Whose Shares are Admitted to Trading on a Regulated Market and Amending 
Directive 2004/109/EC, at 6, COM (2005) 685 final (May 1, 2006). 
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specific date in advance of each shareholders’ meeting. The system is 
usually justified in doing so because it allows shareholders to make ade-
quate preparations to attend the meeting. While the notion of a record 
date is fundamentally similar in most countries, the time span between 
the record date and the general meeting varies significantly from country 
to country. 
In the United Kingdom, the period between the record date and 
meeting is relatively short. As a starting point, the exact period is left to 
the articles of the company itself: it can choose the period freely, but the 
date shall be not more than forty-eight hours before the meeting.103 In 
practice, the vast majority of issuers choose the date as late as eighteen 
hours the day before the general meeting.104 
At the other end of the spectrum, the laws of the United States (or 
rather, Delaware), pursuant to § 213 of Delaware General Corporate 
Law, require a record date to be fixed prior to each meeting, which must 
occur within sixty days of the meeting and no less than ten days prior to 
meeting.105 A recent study found that the median value the companies set 
is a period of about fifty-four days.106 Those who are registered as share-
holders on the record date are entitled to be informed of the meeting, to 
attend, and to vote on it.107 Investors can indirectly find out the time pe-
riod any individual company has set. While the company has no direct 
obligation to communicate this time period to individual investors, it is 
obliged to inform brokers, dealers and other intermediaries at least twen-
ty trading days before the record date about the details.108 This infor-
mation will therefore be widely known. 
German law, in turn, provides a general statutory record date for all 
listed companies. The registration date for any voting entitlement is re-
                                                      
 103. See Uncertificated Securities Regulations, 2001 No. 3755, art. 5, ¶ 41 (U.K.). “For the 
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quired twenty-one days before the general meeting.109 This rule only ap-
plies to bearer shares.110 It is a mandatory rule and cannot be changed by 
the articles of association. The government justifies the length of the pe-
riod because foreign shareholders need appropriate time to prepare for 
their participation.111 
Throughout the European Union, the record date system is a rela-
tively recent concept supported by European Union legislation. The EU 
Shareholder Rights Directive of 2007 112  makes a record date system 
mandatory for all EU member states and sets thirty days as the maximum 
period before which a general meeting could be held.113 As we have seen, 
this large window of time has produced very different results in practice. 
Member States have chosen a range of time periods, from the above-
mentioned two days in the United Kingdom (and Ireland or Cyprus) to 
thirty days in Malta.114 In the recent past, U.K. policy makers considered 
extending the period, which was considered too short.115 These proposals 
have been withdrawn, however.116 The Directive does not give further 
details of how the record date operates. 
Despite these differences in the set record date, all systems experi-
ence similar legal effects. The entitlement to vote necessarily follows the 
ownership of shares on the record date. Put differently, shareholders who 
own the shares on the record date (or “record moment,” more precisely) 
do not lose their voting right if they sell their shares before the meeting. 
Conversely, those who acquire shares after the record date are not enti-
tled to attend or vote at the meeting. The shareholding status quo on the 
record is “frozen” for purposes of the general meeting. The usual justifi-
cation for the system is that it enables shareholders (and the company) to 
adequately prepare for the meeting; arguably it takes a substantial time 
period for information and documents to be shipped in time for the gen-
                                                      
 109. Aktiengesetz [AktG] [Stock Corporation Act], Sept. 6 1965, BGBL. I S. 2479 § 123(3) 
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eral meeting.117 Moreover, the record date system is believed to alleviate 
concerns over conflict in the voting process and to help determine the 
entitlement of voters.118 
2. Risk Decoupling and Record Date Capture 
Although the rules for setting a record date prior to the general 
meeting are configured in detail, one universal and critical feature is the 
inherent shift in risk and voting between the record date and the day of 
the meeting.119 The record date system favors legal certainty over com-
mercial reality. Thus, the record date determines in advance which 
shareholders are entitled to vote and simultaneously accepts those enti-
tled to vote who are allowed to sell their shares between the record date 
and the meeting. This implies that those voting are possibly no longer the 
economically interested shareholders and may no longer be affected by 
the economic consequences of the shareholders’ decisions. Conversely, 
investors who purchase shares between the shareholders’ meeting and 
the record date are not entitled to vote—their interests are therefore not 
considered at the general meeting. There is a serious increase in the shift 
of risk as the period between record date and meeting gets larger. For this 
reason, the European Commission sought to limit the permissible time 
period when drafting the Shareholder Rights Directive.120 This attempt to 
limit the period emerged at the end of the legislative process, however, 
and it was not possible to fully implement the ambitious goal.121 Conse-
quently, the longer period of thirty days was stipulated in the final Di-
rective text.122 
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How can certain investors strategically abuse this system? In a sim-
ple way, the record date system can be combined with the strategy of 
securities lending, as described above. A hedge fund may therefore bor-
row shares precisely over the record date, subsequently return them, and 
therefore acquire the right to vote at the general meeting. As an example, 
consider the aforementioned case of the hedge fund Laxey Partners, 
which briefly increased its stake in British Land to 9% over the record 
period.123 In a similar context, consider the general meeting of the restau-
rant chain Mitchells & Butlers.124 In both cases, a securities lending strat-
egy was used to produce a short-term voting entitlement, and thus, secu-
rities lending was effectuated for its risk-decoupling function. 
The strategy of record date capture can also be used without the 
borrowing of shares, however. Ultimately, any transaction of shares be-
tween the record date and general meeting is potentially capable of 
bringing about a risk-decoupling situation. Every regular shareholder 
who sells any of his shares after the record date—but before the general 
meeting—may vote as a risk-freed or risk-reduced shareholder at the 
general meeting. To be sure, buying will be more expensive than borrow-
ing shares, and therefore probably less common. Also, the parties close 
to this type of transaction will usually agree over the exercise of the vot-
ing rights contractually. Nevertheless, this consideration is another mat-
ter, and it is merely important here to determine the existing possibilities 
for risk decoupling. 
An additional constellation deserves mention, which has been nota-
bly pointed out by Jaap Winter. Companies whose shares are traded on 
various stock markets can take advantage of different record date ar-
rangements for the manipulation purposes of two different markets.125 
For example, if a European company is listed on both a European and an 
American stock exchange, it is conceivable that an investor votes twice. 
First, he may obtain a voting entitlement according to the American rec-
ord date, which is usually about sixty days before the annual general 
meeting.126 If he then switches his American shares into European shares, 
he may possibly be entitled to vote according to their national system a 
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second time at the same meeting. Winter does not provide empirical evi-
dence in support of this constellation, but he asserts that it does happen in 
practice.127 The American Clearing House DTC has recognized this risk 
but, so far has not taken remedial action, especially because there has 
never been an instance of “over voting,” where more votes are cast than 
actually exist.128 
D. Empirical Evidence 
The different constellations described above (derivatives, securities 
lending, and record date capture) beg the question: To what extent are 
these strategies actually used in practice? What is, in other words, the 
empirical reality? 
To date, there is no conclusive empirical analysis demonstrating the 
pervasiveness these strategies have in real life. We know of a number of 
cases that have become known to the broader public via the media or 
through court procedures.129 Beyond these high-profile cases, however, it 
is difficult to assess whether we have exposed only the tip of the iceberg. 
This is mostly due to the hidden nature of the strategies employed. Given 
that there is no obligation of transparency, there is no requirement to dis-
close negative interests in shares. No notice of borrowed shares is re-
quired, nor is the wider public required to be informed of record date 
strategies. Usually, the hedge fund pursues this business strategy for the 
very reason that there is no existing obligation of disclosure. Indeed, 
hedge funds pursue many activist strategies behind the scenes—that is, 
with little or no publicity.130 It is this uncertainty over the frequency of 
risk-decoupling strategies that caused the European market supervisor 
ESMA131 to launch a “call for evidence” in September 2011 in order to 
assess whether regulatory intervention is necessary.132 Much of the evi-
dence did not involve concrete figures or statistics, which, as confirmed 
by their sources, stems from the hidden nature of the activities in ques-
tion.133 
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Some literature attempts to delineate how risk-decoupling strategies 
play out in practice. For example, Henry Hu and Bernard Black released 
the first of major works studying this area. Indeed, Hu and Black com-
piled and documented a number of worldwide incidences of risk decou-
pling. Their most recent paper counts eighty-two cases.134 This compila-
tion allows for a prima facie understanding of the problem; we have to 
bear in mind, however, that these two academics draw their information 
from publicly available sources only. 135  With this understanding, the 
study must be considered as a first impressionistic overview. 
In an ambitious and innovative study, Christoffersen and others ex-
amined the market for securities lending.136 First, they found that the bor-
rowing of securities significantly increases around the record date.137 
This finding supports the conclusion that there is an active market for 
voting rights. The authors show that the volume of borrowed shares 
spikes on the record date in a way that, on average, 0.1% more shares are 
borrowed on these days than on regular days.138 At first blush, this does 
not seem like a dramatic increase, but an average increase of this magni-
tude can mean a big increase in a singular case.139 Second, the study 
found that borrowing costs are extremely low.140 This finding may, how-
ever, be questionable—the low price may be due to the fact that the au-
thors’ data include all types of meetings, including votes on issues of 
relatively low importance. However, the price is known to increase sig-
nificantly for important measures such as restructuring.141 Also, this find-
ing may simply confirm the claim that lenders of securities often have no 
information, or at least no timely information, on when an important vote 
is scheduled.142 
In any case, the study emphasizes the potential importance of bor-
rowing transactions for the voting process.143 Participants of a practition-
ers’ roundtable workshop at Yale School of Management echoed this 
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theory.144 Other market participants have confirmed this assessment. For 
instance, the Florida State Board of Administration (SBA), one of the 
largest pension funds in the United States, recently examined its lending 
volume for general meetings with important voting issues.145 The SBA 
found that there was indeed an unusually high volume of borrowed 
shares in the context of controversial or important general meetings.146 
The informative value of these studies reporting on the tendencies 
of the market for borrowed securities will depend on whether similar 
movements (before and after the record date) can be equally observed on 
the regular stock market. Hypothetically, each and every investor could, 
of course, buy regular shares in order to gain additional voting power 
with respect to a particular voting date. This is why Christoffersen and 
co-authors compared the activities around the record date of borrowing 
and purchase markets.147 The study did not find any comparable increase 
of regular trading around the record date that could correspond to the 
borrowing volume.148 The authors concluded that the regular and legal 
process of “vote buying through share buying” occurs only on a rare ba-
sis, and the temporary borrowing of shares is advantageous for activist 
investors.149 
There is an absence of meaningful data on the use of derivatives to 
effectuate risk decoupling. This lack of data is particularly due to the fact 
that, at least until now, trading of over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives is 
possible without registration or supervision.150 This means that data is 
difficult or impossible to obtain. Nevertheless, the British Investment 
Management Association estimates that negative risk-decoupling strate-
gies in the variant of the use of derivatives occur more frequently in 
practice than share borrowing or record date capture.151 
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In this context, the only reliable figures are from the specific con-
text of “collar transactions,” which were discussed above.152 In particu-
lar, management uses these transactions in an attempt to reduce depend-
ence on the stock price.153 In other words, management seeks to counter-
act the results intended by stock option programs and share-based remu-
neration agreements, which attempt to bind remuneration to stock per-
formance. Empirical studies have shown that management and executive 
staff use these instruments frequently and expressly to avoid the risk ex-
posure of their shares.154 
Finally, a general study on the stock price development of listed 
companies by Yair Listokin deserves mention. Listokin examined the 
contrary valuations of shares by both shareholders and the market to 
show that both groups reach different conclusions at narrow and conten-
tious general meetings.155 For example, when shareholders vote in favor 
of a management proposal by a close majority, the market evaluates this 
negatively, and vice versa. From this result, Listokin believes that con-
clusions can be drawn on the existence of risk-decoupling strategies in 
the company.156 This concerns at least the special constellation, where 
the management profits itself from a risk-decoupling situation. If this 
situation is the case, the empirical results of Listokin’s study are con-
sistent with the theoretical expectations. In both constellations, the voting 
process is distorted, which leads to a divergence between voting result 
and market valuation. 
IV. PROBLEM PERSPECTIVES 
The analysis so far has shown that risk-decoupling strategies are le-
gally possible, and that activist hedge funds are indeed ready to use them 
to pursue their goals. While a certain uneasiness from these strategies is 
immediately conceivable, a thorough analysis is required to justify any 
legislative intervention. If no case is made for market problems, the phe-
nomenon could equally be endorsed as a market-efficient choice by spe-
cific actors.157 In order to examine the implications of risk-decoupling 
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strategies, three different perspectives may be selected to illuminate the 
economic problems underpinned: a classical principal–agent relationship, 
a perspective from information costs, and a corporate finance view. Each 
of the three perspectives will be considered in turn. 
A. Principal–Agent Perspective 
The first view is a classical perspective stemming from the well-
known principal–agent theory, which is well established in corporate law 
and governance.158 Here, the claim is that a risk-decoupled shareholder 
creates new agency costs. In short, a new actor enters the stage, and the 
presence of this new type of shareholder confronts other shareholders 
and investors with additional costs.159 
1. Risk Decoupling and Agency Costs 
A risk-decoupled shareholder has a different risk profile than a reg-
ular shareholder and will therefore exercise voting power, depending on 
the situation, either in a more or a less risk-averse way than the average 
shareholder. Economic theory and empirical studies have shown that 
some shareholders who have voting power that exceeds their relative 
economic exposure tend to show nonjustifiable risk-averse behavior.160 
This finding has important implications for the community of sharehold-
ers as they share a joint enterprise and a common interest. Institutions 
such as shareholder voting and majority rule derive their authority im-
plicitly from the assumed fact that shareholders will vote in an optimal 
relationship to the capital invested. From this assumption, the propor-
tionality principle applicable to risk and influence has been developed, 
which leads, in its strictest form, to the principle of “one share, one 
                                                                                                                         
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW (1991); see also BRIAN CHEFFINS, COMPANY LAW: 
THEORY, STRUCTURE, AND OPERATION (1996); HOUTHAKKER & WILLIAMSON, supra note 89, 130; 
Fama, supra note 89; Gilson & Kraakman, Mechanisms, supra note 91. More recently, with regard 
to the financial crisis of 2008, see Gilson & Kraakman, Market Efficiency, supra note 91; Zingales, 
supra note 91, at 31. 
 158. See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behav-
ior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976). For an overview, see 
John Armour et al., Agency Problems and Legal Strategies, in THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW, 
supra note 2. 
 159. See generally Jill E. Fisch, Securities Intermediaries and the Separation of Ownership 
from Control, 33 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 877 (2010); Andrew Lumsden & Saul Fridman, Proxy Voting 
and Vote Selling, 61 KEEPING GOOD COS. 332, 333, 337 (2009). 
 160 . RONALD J. GILSON & BERNARD BLACK, THE LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE 
ACQUISITIONS 249 (2d ed. 1995). 
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vote.”161 This normative principle of legal policy holds that one should 
ensure a proportionate allocation of share ownership and control in a 
company. “Ownership” in this context can be equated with “cash flow 
rights.” The principle implies that any shareholder should own the same 
fraction of cash flow rights and voting rights, thus attributing an amount 
of control to a shareholder that is proportionate to his shareholding. In-
herent in the principle is the proscription of deviations from a propor-
tionate allocation of ownership and control via so-called “control-
enhancing mechanisms” (CEMs).162 While academically debated, many 
perceive proportionality as being rationally compelling based first on the 
observation that shareholders—as the company’s residual claimants—
have the strongest interest in maximizing firm value and, second, on the 
belief that voting power should match economic incentives alone. Addi-
tionally, recent public debates about proportionality have assumed an 
emotional dimension; the idea that each share entitles the owners to 
equal influence has intuitive appeal. It has led to slogans such as “share-
holder democracy,” based on assumed parallels between societal and 
corporate governance.163 The ultimate objective of establishing a “one 
share one vote” (OSOV) principle in the European Union has been pur-
sued on two levels, with diverging methods and aims. Based on the rec-
ommendations of an academic expert group, the European Commission 
has pondered whether to introduce mandatory legislation, whereas the 
Court of Justice of the European Union has indirectly been working on a 
case-law based approach over the past years. 
Easterbrook and Fischel authored the quintessential OSOV support-
ing paper in 1983. The article emphasizes that deviations from an equal 
voting right in the company will create agency costs for management.164 
This essential assertion is based on two instances: first, and fundamental-
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ly, the two scholars argue that shareholders in possession of dispropor-
tionate voting rights will not make optimal decisions for the company.165 
Where a shareholder bears a higher economic risk than is reflected in his 
voting right,166 his incentives to vote may be distorted. This is because he 
might be more willing to accept a risk when his financial interest is lower 
than his actual influence in the company. Conversely, if his financial ex-
posure is greater than his equity share, he might not be in a position 
where his voice is heard in the same way as it corresponds to his inter-
ests. 
Second, the paper claims that disproportionate ownership structures 
impede corporate takeovers or changes of control, thereby strengthening 
the position of managers over shareholders.167 Disproportionate voting 
rights can thus lead to an insulated management position, especially 
when the management is supported by, or connected with, the sharehold-
er who enjoys special voting rights.168 This is relevant at three levels: 
first, differentiated voting rights facilitate control by an economic mi-
nority stake and make a takeover extremely difficult without a break-
through rule, which sets them aside during the period of a takeover bid. 
Second, means of circumventing OSOV, such as voting agreements, may 
increase managerial discretion and discourage potentially value-
increasing takeovers.169 Third, voting restrictions such as voting caps can 
represent important antitakeover devices that discourage potential bid-
ders from making an offer.170 Moreover, many recognize that deviations 
from OSOV permit an over-representation of minority interests in the 
company’s governance, leading to the possibility that there will be di-
verging preferences among the members of the board. In this way, 
schemes such as these expose the firm to an uncompensated risk of mak-
ing inconsistent or illogical decisions.171 
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The above-mentioned arguments certainly cannot aggregate to sup-
port the problem of risk decoupling. The strongest claim—that there are 
distorted incentives for the exercise of voting rights—remains an essen-
tial feature of risk-decoupled shareholders. A shareholder who eliminates 
his exposure will vote for other reasons than someone who has responsi-
bility for his financial position. Even if it is only a gradual reduction in 
risk, the decisions and votes are already to some extent distorted. 
Aside from the mere distortion of incentives, the second point to be 
mentioned is the so-called private benefits of control that a risk-
decoupled shareholder may pursue. The concept of special benefits (pri-
vate benefits of control) stems from finance scholarship and is a relative-
ly new discovery. The traditional literature has assumed that all shares 
are homogeneous, they exist equally, and that shareholders therefore 
generate returns on the same scale. Over the last thirty years, however, a 
different view has slowly gained support. According to this view, a con-
trolling shareholder can reach a number of advantages, which other 
shareholders cannot obtain. Starting from a simple model in 1980,172 the 
concept of “private benefits” has become central to understanding the 
relationships between different groups of shareholders. Empirical studies 
have shown that the level of private benefits gained by controlling share-
holders diverges significantly, and depends on the legal system in ques-
tion.173 These levels of private benefits are also used as a universal indi-
cator of the principal–agent conflict—the degree of severity between ma-
jority and minority shareholders in a jurisdiction.174 
These private benefits can arise in many different shapes and con-
stellations.175 How then do they accompany risk-decoupled shareholders? 
A shareholder whose risk falls short of his voting influence can profit 
from disproportionate benefits in comparison with the other sharehold-
ers. The Mylan-Perry case described above176 serves as an extreme ex-
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ample: the hedge fund Perry became involved with Mylan without risk. It 
could thereby enjoy the additional benefit in the form of its involvement 
with the competitor King. More precisely, in such an extreme situation, 
the shareholder resolution in favor of the takeover benefits one share-
holder in particular (Perry), but it does not bring the same benefits for all 
other shareholders. On a less dramatic level, the same result can be ob-
served. The fact that the risk profile of one shareholder is distinct from 
that of other shareholders means that in transactions with the company, 
an investment decision or a specific management strategy for the compa-
ny as a whole (including the (minority) shareholders) may be both detri-
mental and beneficial for the risk-decoupled shareholder. 
In addition to the distorted voting incentives, these special benefits 
represent an additional and distinct cost factor. The distortion of voting 
interests means that the risk-decoupled investor enters into either “too 
much” or “too little” risk, in comparison with a regular shareholder who 
enters with proper risk alignment. The pursuit of private benefits is dis-
tinguishable; it allows the voting shareholders to pursue separate ad-
vantages due to increased voting power. For instance, if a hedge fund, H, 
holds 5% of the shares of company X, but temporarily acquires an addi-
tional 5% by means of securities borrowing transactions over the record 
date, certain aspects have to be distinguished. On the one hand, there is 
the danger that H will vote in a more risk-friendly way than it would as a 
regular shareholder because H bears a reduced risk exposure compared 
with other shareholders. The co-shareholders are thus affected by H’s 
increased appetite for risk because, unlike regular shareholders, H does 
not fully feel the consequences of its decisions. An additional and sepa-
rate danger comes from a variety of private benefits; H may use its vot-
ing power of 10% of the votes in a way that the company enters into 
transactions that are advantageous only for H, either directly or via a 
third party. In extreme cases, as with Mylan-Perry, H can cause X to en-
ter into inherently harmful measures of which H itself, however, will 
benefit because of an interest in a competitor or takeover target. 
2. Reduction of Agency Costs? 
In contrast to the discussion thus far, some argue in the literature 
that risk-decoupling structures do not exacerbate agency costs, but could 
rather reduce them.177 This claim is based on the following reasoning: 
one of the main problems of shareholder voting rests on the fact that 
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small shareholders generally do not exercise their voting rights. This 
finding is the well-known phenomenon of “rational apathy” of (small) 
shareholders.178 The argument then deduces that these apathetic share-
holders could transfer their voting rights to other shareholders. The col-
lective action problem could be overcome in this way—shareholders 
who take an active interest in the strategic direction of the company 
could accumulate a stronger voting position in order to effectively con-
trol the management and thus reduce managerial agency costs. Especially 
in an environment characterized by a high dispersion of shares, medium-
sized shareholders could awaken to become an effective and important 
controller of management.179 This process would alleviate the above-
described collective action problem. 
This claim is an old argument in disguise. Already in the literature 
on isolated vote trading, investigating whether it could produce value-
enhancing situations, proponents argue that such an approach could help 
the problem of investors’ passivity which could thus be overcome.180 
This argument was primarily made in the context of takeovers and acqui-
sitions, to enable the bidder to acquire additional voting rights and thus 
replace the management of the target company.181 Opponents have point-
ed out that this theory is based on two conditions that are not always met: 
first, the proposed acquisition was actually in the interests of the share-
holders, and second, the purchaser used the right to vote in a way that is 
actually in the interests of all shareholders.182 
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These objections also prove viable in the context at issue here. In 
particular, the second argument is the key point: all structures of risk de-
coupling demonstrate vividly that the voter usually pursues objectives 
that are precisely not in the interest of the wider community of share-
holders, but rather uses its risk-decoupled position deliberately for the 
purpose of achieving her own benefits, and for disadvantaging other in-
vestors. There are two conflict situations that are fundamentally differ-
ent. First, in corporate takeovers, the management of the target company 
often acts out of self-interest (usually the risk of losing their position); 
and second, in contrast, the vote buyer threatens in risk-decoupling situa-
tions to consciously undermine or manipulate the voting process for lack 
of his own risk, or because of reduced risk. This is often to the detriment 
of third parties. Whether one adopts this traditional argumentation or not, 
it fails to make a convincing claim in the context of interest here.183 
Additionally, risk-decoupling structures may not only be used to 
reduce or eliminate risk, but can even serve to create a situation where 
the negative interest exceeds the positive interest entirely.184 Where a 
short position, created with derivatives, exceeds the value of the long 
position, it is in the immediate interest of the shareholder to support val-
ue-reducing activities that damage the company’s business. An effective 
control of the administration to the benefit of all shareholders seems ra-
ther implausible in such a scenario. This point also highlights the main 
difference with the traditional “one share, one vote” debate: deviations 
from “one share, one vote” surely disturb the proportionality between 
ownership and voting rights.185 For example, multiple voting rights are 
distortions of the influence of the voting shareholders, but unlike risk-
decoupling structures, they do not permit the complete elimination of the 
risk, or even the creation of a negative interest, which exceeds the posi-
tive interest. Where both issues are treated similarly in the literature, they 
ignore a fundamental difference. 
All of this should not undermine the possibility that risk-decoupling 
strategies may help overcome the principal–agent conflict in individual 
cases. For instance, in the case of British Land, the hedge fund Laxey’s 
borrowed shares can be interpreted as an attempt to more efficiently 
monitor management in the interests of all shareholders.186 The funda-
mental objection remains, however; there is no guarantee that the voting 
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rights borrowed by Laxey will not be used for its own private ad-
vantages, contrary to the interests of other shareholders. Already, the 
theoretical possibility of being able to pursue such special benefits exac-
erbates the conflict among the various members or groups of sharehold-
ers.187 The alleged claim that risk-decoupling structures are useful is not 
convincing as a whole; in individual situations, however, opinions may 
differ. This observation will be revisited in the pages that follow. 
3. Objection 
An additional counter-argument might be that similar conflicts of-
ten occur outside the risk-decoupling structure, and they have been un-
regulated so far. For example, institutional investors often hold shares in 
a large number of portfolio companies. This means that in particular cir-
cumstances, they may hold the shares of two direct competitors. Institu-
tional investors will then determine their voting decision by pure arith-
metic—where do they stand to win most?188 This may mean that an insti-
tutional investor, A, is forced (by its individual portfolio composition) to 
exercise its voting power in a portfolio company, B, to the detriment of 
B’s shareholders because A holds a much higher share in portfolio com-
pany C, a competitor of B, and will thus secure a net profit over both po-
sitions. A similar situation would be if company C is a takeover target of 
company B.189 It could thus be argued that similar conflicts of interest 
can occur, without risk-decoupling structures or elegantly devised elabo-
rate strategies, solely through the holding of shares in different compa-
nies.190 
While this objection is powerful, it must be ultimately rejected for 
several reasons. First, it can be assumed with great probability that, inso-
far as these conflict situations exist for institutional investors, they are 
caused by fortune, and are not caused deliberately. This means that in a 
random distribution of these situations in the market, the effects can can-
cel each other out due to individual investors and their opposite align-
ments. Hence, a potentially and individually arising conflict can be offset 
by a market diversification.191 
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Second, the conflict situation imagined here would have an entirely 
different quality than the one created by a risk-decoupling structure. This 
can be demonstrated in two aspects. First, it is obvious (using the exam-
ple above) that investor A meets the full economic risk on both sides of 
the equation in both portfolio companies. Its position is not hedged by 
derivatives, and it is not based only on temporary, borrowed shares. The 
interests thus differ significantly from that of a risk-decoupled position, 
and the probability that A manipulates the voting process is much lower. 
Moreover, the resulting agency costs will be significantly lower than in a 
risk-decoupling situation. In the cost calculation conducted above, we 
distinguished between costs due to a distortion of the voting incentives 
from those due to the pursuit of private benefits. 192  While a risk-
decoupled shareholder creates both components, A is biased by only pos-
sible private benefits. This is because A’s influence and risk in portfolio 
company B are entirely proportionate. Only because of its stake in C 
does the opportunity arise to improve A’s overall position. In other 
words, A’s incentives are not distorted because of an increased risk 
friendliness per se, but solely because of a conflict situation, based on 
A’s portfolio structure. This structure allows extraction of a number of 
private benefits. These benefits may simply be the well-known related 
party transactions, or other conflicts of interest, which are being con-
trolled by traditional corporate law.193 Overall, one must conclude that a 
conflict situation that exists solely on the basis of random fractional 
ownership in two or more competitors shows a fundamentally different 
quality than deliberately induced risk decoupling, like the scenario de-
scribed here. 
4. Implications 
The analysis thus far shows that risk decoupling can create a prin-
cipal–agent problem, which imposes costs on the company. There are 
also costs that take the form of distortion of voting incentives and private 
benefits for the decoupled shareholder, both with possible adverse con-
sequences for minority shareholders and actual or potential investors. 
This finding is later taken up again in the development of concrete regu-
latory solutions.194 First, however, the other problem perspectives will be 
discussed. 
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B. Information Costs 
The second perspective considers the problem of risk decoupling as 
an issue of information and transaction costs. The claim here is that all 
risk-decoupling strategies have the effect of imposing additional infor-
mation costs for investors and shareholders, and thus ultimately create 
higher costs of capital for the company. 
This thesis is developed in two steps. First, we have to understand a 
few basic aspects of the concept of information and transaction costs, and 
how instruments of corporate law traditionally contribute to their reduc-
tion. Second, we demonstrate how the topic under consideration here, 
risk decoupling, runs against this objective. 
1. Information Costs and Corporate Law 
Information costs are considered in law and economics literature as 
part of market transaction costs.195 For example, if market participants 
consider entering into a particular transaction, they have to find a suitable 
contract partner, as well as information about the nature of the product to 
be sold, including its quality and price. Through this process of infor-
mation gathering and verifying, the market participants incur costs.196 
Accordingly, the reduction of information costs is a priority objec-
tive of any jurisdiction. One conclusion of the Coase theorem is that 
transaction and information costs can lead to market distortions.197 Be-
cause these costs are regularly nonnegotiable, the original specification 
and allocation of property rights is important for the expected transaction 
costs. 
Market participants incur these same kinds of information costs 
when transacting over securities. Corporate law attempts to reduce these 
information costs in many ways. Two of these methods are important for 
the present analysis: the legal nature of shares as property rights, and the 
corporate numerus clausus. 
First, consider the legal classification of a share as a property right, 
as opposed to a contractual position. A shareholder does not merely ac-
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quire a contractual, personal claim against the corporation, but rather 
acquires a right in the corporation.198 This organization of the share as a 
property-type bundle of rights facilitates its transferability and tradabil-
ity. The fungibility of shares is an essential criterion for the existence of 
modern capital markets. Share acquirers must not investigate the specific 
characteristics of the shares they purchase every time they do so because 
by virtue of the legal framework, they can expect to acquire a bundle of 
the usual characteristics (without which large-scale trades would be un-
thinkable). They can assume to obtain a more or less standardized securi-
ty, so that it is sufficient for their trade to specify the type and number of 
pieces. 
Thus, the creation of property rights overcomes some of the weak-
nesses of contract law and the principle of relativity. The economic con-
sequences cannot be overestimated. Property rights can create markets: 
they allow the continuous exchange of goods—in this case shares in 
companies—on global markets.199 
This property law side of corporate law goes hand-in-hand with the 
principle of numerus clausus.200 Corporate law offers a limited number 
of legal forms at the disposal of firms to choose for their organization, 
including private limited or public limited companies, partnerships, et-
cetera. In the second instance, within the corporate form chosen, the law 
allows for a certain number of types of shares to be created, although the 
law is more generous here in permitting a certain variation of these fea-
tures. Through standardization, the principle equally aims to reduce in-
formation costs for market participants, among other objectives.201 Firms 
that must choose from a catalogue of permissible corporate forms and 
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shares are thus prevented from creating opaque and nontransparent ar-
rangements, which would be burdensome for third parties trying to eval-
uate them. 
2. Risk Decoupling and Information Costs 
After revisiting the traditional approach corporate law takes toward 
reducing information costs, it is now possible to turn our attention to the 
ways in which risk-decoupling activities interfere with the general objec-
tives outlined above. The key point here is that risk-decoupling strate-
gies, which are strategically used by market participants (in particular, 
hedge funds) undermine the main regulatory goals described above. In-
stead of striving to reduce information and transaction costs, these strate-
gies create additional costs for market participants. 
Distortions in the risk exposure of investors increase the infor-
mation and transaction costs of other market participants. This primarily 
applies to investors who wish to acquire shares in the company, but also 
to co-shareholders. Under normal circumstances, they all stand to benefit 
from the standards described above because a limited number of legal 
forms and a limited number of share types would normally mean that an 
investor can usually assess the rights and properties they receive in a re-
liable manner. The “standard product” they purchase, is the traditional 
bundle of rights, consisting of the well-known management and property 
rights that accrue to the shareholders according to the paradigm of corpo-
rate law. The acquirer can therefore make a relatively simple purchasing 
decision, and is not obligated to conduct extensive research to evaluate 
the individual aspects of his shareholder position, or the potentially mod-
ified parts of the legal status to be acquired, or even engage external con-
sultants. 
As a general rule, the law creates a standardized bundle of rights 
and obligations, including the right to vote, and the corresponding eco-
nomic risk exposure. Risk-decoupling strategies undermine this legisla-
tive choice to bundle together influence and risk. It is, in other words, an 
attempt to split the legislative bundle by way of private autonomy. It is 
the attempt to use contract law to undo was has been fixed together by 
property law. If, as we said above, property law is preferable over con-
tract law for creating and supporting markets,202 a reintroduction of the 
latter causes problems for the former. In our context, the presence of 
risk-modified shares among the usual shares of the company requires 
investors to take precautions, make investigations, and possibly even en-
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gage external advice on the specific characteristics of the shares they are 
contemplating buying.203 In particular, the investor can no longer be sure 
that the normal combination of risk and influence is followed.204 The 
problem is exacerbated by the fact that the mere technical and abstract 
possibility of risk decoupling is sufficient for causing severe disruptions 
for the entire trade of the company’s shares, regardless of whether they 
actually occur in the company. This is because once the investors are 
aware that the earlier assumption of a link between influence and risk can 
no longer be generally trusted, additional investigation costs are una-
voidable. 
3. Regulatory Target 
The above analysis makes it clear that the problem under considera-
tion here is specifically relevant to one particular area of corporate law. 
The phenomenon of risk decoupling will be most salient for large, listed 
companies, which rely on capital markets for financing. The problem of 
information cost will be most relevant in these companies, and investors 
must rely most heavily on the standardized aspects of securities. By con-
trast, small, private companies are usually governed by increased person-
al relationships. This means that personal information can overcome the 
problems of anonymity described above. Additionally, private companies 
will usually have different ways of conflict resolution and overall gov-
ernance.205 To preempt the discussion on regulatory choices, any regula-
tory intervention should focus on the market segment of only public, 
listed companies. 
C. Corporate Finance 
Thus far, we have approached the analytical discussion from the 
vantage point of two perspectives: principal–agent conflict and infor-
mation costs. An additional perspective offers promise; it looks at the 
phenomenon of risk decoupling from the view of corporate finance and it 
provides far-reaching insights into the financial law aspects of risk de-
coupling, in addition to the legal characteristics of shares. 
The starting point is the traditional distinction between debt and eq-
uity. This distinction is fundamental to the structuring of corporate fi-
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nance, and gained importance, among other things, in tax, accounting, 
insolvency, and corporate law and governance.206 
Crucial to the discussion is the corporate law side of this differenti-
ation. Shareholders provide equity to the company, thereby enabling the 
shareholders to become part owners of the company. External parties 
provide borrowing, however, and they act as separate entities because 
they only sign a regular loan contract with the company. It follows that 
equity investors have rights in the company, and creditors have rights 
against the company. This distinction is significant, for example, when it 
comes to questions of control and strategic direction of the company. On 
both points, only the equity investor has influence, whereas the external 
creditor has only contractual claims arising out of his loan agreement. 
What justifies this dramatic differentiation? The most important 
distinction between debt and equity capital is the risk that the respective 
provider of capital enters into.207 Without discussing the details, equity 
investment is perceived as much riskier than debt financing because eq-
uity holders’ profit expectations are more closely attuned to the econom-
ic perspective of the company than the position of lenders. Lenders usu-
ally get a steady return on interest, usually a fixed rate per year, and at 
the end of the term, the repayment of the original loan amount. Equity 
investors, however, must bear a double burden of risk—the capital pro-
vided to finance the company will only bear interest if and when a profit 
has been generated, and ultimately it will only be refunded if liquidation 
proceeds cover the liabilities.208 
This basic distinction allows us to understand the economic justifi-
cation for voting rights in favor of the shareholders. Voting or control 
rights can be simultaneously understood as a type of compensation for 
the risk entered into, and as an incentive to invest. By virtue of the fact 
that providing equity capital is risky, the equity holders will receive a 
control device, a tool to at least partially influence the fate of the compa-
ny and their own funds.209 
It is now possible for us to understand the impact of risk-
decoupling activities on the financing structure of the company. Risk-
decoupled shareholders can be described as shareholders who reduce the 
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inherent risk of the equity financing and, ideally, eliminate it completely. 
They want the best of both worlds. On the one hand, they want to be eq-
uity investors with ownership of the company’s shares and control rights; 
on the other hand, they want the risk profile of an external debt investor 
without giving up their control rights, which are not provided for by the 
statutory system. In an extreme situation, a fully risk-decoupled share-
holder can even reach the “best of three worlds” when they—in their po-
sition as shareholder, and with the risk profile of a debt holder—attract 
additional financial benefits from participating in a competitor (as in the 
Mylan-Perry example210).211 
The result is a contradiction between values. Economically, accord-
ing to the above principles, a risk-decoupled share is more akin to debt 
than equity, but legally speaking, a risk decoupler remains a shareholder 
(of an empty shell) and retains the voting right. 
In other words, the shareholder attempts to strip off the risk which 
is characteristic of equity investment, while formally remaining a share-
holder. Herein lies the problem: according to the principles discussed 
above, shareholders are given the right to vote simply by virtue of the 
fact that they carry a distinctive economic risk. If this risk is eliminated, 
the justification for the assignment of voting rights disappears. For risk-
decoupled shareholders, the legitimacy of exercising voting rights no 
longer exists. 
Viewed in the broader context, scholars have long argued that 
shareholders bear the residual risk of the firm.212 That is, if the enterprise 
fails, shareholders only have a claim to what remains after all other con-
stituencies are satisfied. This position of residual risk bearer provides 
shareholders with the (relatively speaking) best incentives to make the 
company profitable for their own interest. It also justifies granting them 
the right to make strategic decisions for both the benefit of the company 
and the economy as a whole.213 
This insight supports the point made here: If the risk exposure is the 
real justification for shareholders entitled to vote at all, this justification 
disappears where the shareholder is able to eliminate that risk. A risk-
free shareholder cannot fulfill the function of the vote—to express the 
best possible decision for the strategic direction of the company. A risk-
free shareholder will always exercise his voting rights for purely selfish 
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and potentially detrimental social considerations. The right to vote in this 
way loses its positive function, while a rational actor would exercise it in 
the spirit of the firm community. It potentially becomes an instrument 
prone to abuse, leading to self-benefit. 
V. SOLUTIONS 
Ever since risk-decoupling strategies have become known to the 
wider public and generally increased in significance, lawmakers and reg-
ulators have been looking for solutions. In 2007, then SEC Chairman 
Christopher Cox indicated that the various risk-decoupling strategies are 
“almost certainly going to force further regulatory response to ensure that 
investors’ interests are protected. This is already a serious issue and it is 
showing all signs of growing.”214 Following up on this announcement, 
the SEC conducted a public consultation on the topic in 2010 in order to 
anticipate eventual regulation. 215  Likewise, the new European market 
authority, ESMA, has launched a consultation that assesses the case for 
regulatory intervention.216 
For several years, regulators in various jurisdictions have attempted 
to find answers to the multifaceted problems and conflicts. The following 
analysis does not discuss these attempts, but rather proceeds to examine 
the problem from the vantage point of each particular regulatory tech-
nique. All possible regulatory models are structured, assessed, and com-
pared. They will be seen in the specific legal context of the European 
Union. The goal is to ultimately develop the most desirable regulatory 
response for EU institutions. 
A. Doing Nothing 
Any discussion of regulatory intervention begins with the option of 
doing nothing. It has become the standard in modern legislative “impact 
assessments” to discuss policy considerations in the context of “no ac-
tion,” or “to do nothing.”217 Thinking about this option is a helpful exer-
cise. It shows the regulator what happens if no regulatory action is taken, 
and prevents the regulator from jumping into the various interventionist 
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approaches without reflecting on whether the problem needs regulatory 
intervention in the first place. This forces the regulator to justify its final 
choice. 
1. Immediate Consequences 
In connection with the subject matter under consideration here, do-
ing nothing would ultimately mean “nonregulation” of the various risk-
decoupling constellations. Consequently, shareholders and investors 
could, as before, freely dispose over voting rights and economic risk. A 
few comments in the literature seem to be pointing toward that direction. 
For example, the eminent American academic Henry Manne argued 
nearly fifty years ago that the free exchange of voting rights would bene-
fit shareholders in much the same way the exchange of goods brings wel-
fare gains to other areas of the economy.218 In a similar vein, Robert 
Clark advocated in 1979 that the free trade of votes in a company should 
be permitted.219 According to Clark, the advantage of such an approach 
lies in the possibility of overcoming the free rider problem—an unre-
stricted accumulation of voting rights would allow shareholders to gain 
greater influence in the company and to exert stronger influence over 
management. Diversified, passive retail investors who are not interested 
in exercising control over management could thus forgo their voting 
rights and clear the way for others. This way, the apathy problem result-
ing from dispersed shareholder ownership could be overcome.220 
In the United Kingdom, former City Minister Lord Paul Myners 
made policy recommendations in favor of readjusting the relationship 
between voting rights and share ownership.221 In a number of reports, 
Lord Myners emphasized the need for a differentiated weighting of 
shares in order to encourage institutional investors to take up their own-
ership role more seriously.222 According to his view, additional voting 
rights for long-term shareholders could create a more sustainable invest-
ment culture. This would remedy the perceived short-term orientation of 
investors during the global financial crisis. Lord Myners stigmatized the 
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current situation with the notion of the “ownerless corporation.”223 This 
suggestion has initiated a lively debate over the desirability of such dif-
ferentiated voting rights. A few commentators gave a positive re-
sponse,224 but the dominant view (particularly among institutional inves-
tors) expressed skepticism and outright rejection of the proposals.225 Lord 
Myners later went on to suggest an even more radical proposal by rec-
ommending that shareholders be given the ability to buy and sell their 
voting rights independently from their shareholding, namely, a complete 
separation of ownership and voting rights.226  According to this plan, 
shareholders who never vote could sell their voting rights to others who 
do want to vote. Again, reactions to this suggestion were negative.227 Fi-
nally, he proposed introducing the option of new nonvoting shares to 
existing shareholders, allowing them subsequently to concentrate their 
engagement with the company on either a voting or nonvoting position, 
thus fostering their identification with the company.228 It has to be noted 
that Myners’s remarks were delivered at the height of the global financial 
crisis and in the context of growing fear that liberal takeover laws could 
put British firms at an increased risk of falling into foreign hands. This 
fear is exemplified by Kraft’s takeover of the British company Cad-
bury.229 Lord Myners insisted that these fears were not merely xenopho-
bic230, but it is well known that an effect of the crisis led an overwhelm-
ing number of Western economies to drift toward protectionist tenden-
cies.231 Ultimately, the proposals have not resulted in legislation in the 
United Kingdom. 
These discussions from academia and politics lead, to a varying de-
gree, into a liberalization of the relationship between share ownership 
and voting rights. The aforementioned reflections cannot simply be criti-
cized as merely too “market believing.” However, it is obvious that they 
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rely on two basic and implicit assumptions. First, they seem to assume 
that market forces are strong enough to form adequate prices for both full 
shares and mere voting rights. Second, it is assumed that the decoupling 
of shares and voting rights does not create other distorting effects. Al-
ready the first of these two assumptions, however, is not free from doubt. 
To be sure, the example of preference shares illustrates how the market 
price can adequately reflect the different voting entitlements of classes of 
shares.232 However, the example of the extremely low borrowing fee233 
for shares in the context of securities lending over the record date, as dis-
cussed above, casts doubts over the ability of the market to reflect the 
value of voting rights in all situations.234 There are good reasons to be-
lieve that lenders are faced with a free-rider problem in a way that they 
could expect remaining shareholders to vote, and thus entrust their own 
shares to the borrower at a fee that is too low.235 
Additional questions arise when the perspective shifts from the 
pricing process of voting rights to the consequences felt by other market 
participants. Even if the pricing process works properly and produces 
efficient outcomes between the two parties, it imposes costs onto third 
parties such as shareholders and investors. 
2. Self-regulation 
A liberal market solution may have other advantages. The Coase 
theorem teaches us that market participants will enter into their own bar-
gaining process and produce separate solutions based on their private 
autonomy.236 Can we expect such a solution to occur in the context of 
risk decoupling? 
A few examples may make us optimistic.237 Consider the situation 
in the United States, where the business world has been waiting for long 
time for the SEC to act in response to risk-decoupling strategies.238 In the 
meantime, companies themselves have begun to impose disclosure obli-
gations in their own bylaws in order to force publicity over decoupled 
shareholders.239 For example, Delaware-incorporated Pfizer, Inc. amend-
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ed its bylaws in 2008 so that each shareholder who initiates a shareholder 
resolution, or an election of directors is obliged to make specific disclo-
sures about their risk exposure.240 The amended, decisive part of the by-
laws now reads as follows: 
A Proponent’s notice to the Secretary shall set forth as to each mat-
ter the Proponent proposes to bring before the annual meeting: 
. . . . 
(f) a description of any agreement, arrangement or understanding 
(including any derivative or short positions, profit interests, options, 
hedging transactions, and borrowed or loaned shares) that has been 
entered into as of the date of the Proponent’s notice by, or on behalf 
of, the Proponent or any of its affiliates or associates, the effect or 
intent of which is to mitigate loss to, manage risk or benefit of share 
price changes for, or increase or decrease the voting power of the 
Proponent or any of its affiliates or associates with respect to shares 
of stock of the Corporation, and a representation that the Proponent 
will notify the Corporation in writing of any such agreement, ar-
rangement or understanding in effect as of the record date for the 
meeting promptly following the later of the record date or the date 
notice of the record date is first publicly disclosed.241 
Sara Lee Corporation, an American consumer goods manufacturer, simi-
larly changed its bylaws242: 
Section 10(3) 
Any stockholder’s notice [for proposals to the general meeting] 
shall set forth . . . (iii) as to the stockholder giving the notice, any 
Proposed Nominee and any Stockholder Associated Person,  
. . . .  
(C) whether and the extent to which such stockholder, Proposed 
Nominee or Stockholder Associated Person, directly or indirectly 
(through brokers, nominees or otherwise), is subject to or during the 
last six months has engaged in any hedging, derivative or other 
transaction or series of transactions or entered into any other agree-
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ment, arrangement or understanding (including any short interest, 
any borrowing or lending of securities or any proxy or voting 
agreement), the effect or intent of which is to 
. . . .  
(x) manage risk or benefit of changes in the price of Company Se-
curities for such stockholder, Proposed Nominee or Stockholder As-
sociated Person, or 
(y) increase or decrease the voting power of such stockholder, Pro-
posed Nominee or Stockholder Associated Person in the Corpora-
tion disproportionately to such person’s economic interest in the 
Company Securities.243 
In the meantime, other American corporations have introduced pro-
posals to amend their bylaws.244 Just like the two passages cited above, 
the proposals would impose a comprehensive disclosure duty for every 
contractual arrangement, or even a tacit agreement, that decouples or 
intends to decouple voting right and economic risk. The disclosure duty 
applies only in a very specific situation, however: where the shareholder, 
on her own initiative, makes proposals for the agenda of the general 
meeting (this may be for the appointment of managers or any other reso-
lution). These initiatives are rare in the U.S. corporate context. This is 
rare because, first, difficult legal and financial hurdles exist and, second, 
because the highly dispersed ownership means that it is very difficult to 
convince other shareholders to vote and to support an initiative. Only 
rarely will the shareholder be engaged in a “proxy fight,” where activist 
shareholders compete with management (or other shareholders) to secure 
a maximum of proxies from other investors with the aim of reaching a 
majority for a specific resolution.245 All in all, the proposed amendments 
to bylaws of U.S. corporations will apply only in very limited circum-
stances, and are therefore of limited importance. 
An alternative strategy of self-regulation might be more promising. 
The hedge fund industry in its entirety will not be interested in a devel-
opment where singular events of risk decoupling are associated with the 
entire business sector. For this reason, the Hedge Fund Working Group, 
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an association of the hedge fund industry, conducted a consultation in 
2007 which led to an instrument of self-governance.246 Aside from delib-
erate self-regulation, the threat of legal action may have played a role in 
initiating the document. 247  The resulting Code of Conduct, entitled 
“HFSB Standards,” was adopted by the Working Group in 2008, and is 
now administered by the Hedge Fund Standard Board.248 It can be adopt-
ed by individual hedge funds on the basis of a “comply or explain” ap-
proach.249 The Code also takes on risk decoupling and securities lending:  
A hedge fund manager should not borrow stock in order to vote. 
The HFSB acknowledges that there might be specific situations 
where it should be acceptable to vote on borrowed stock, e.g. when 
a fund is invested in shares (and the trade has settled), but the shares 
have not transferred into their name.250 
As welcoming as the Code may be, it is nonetheless unsatisfactory 
in many respects. In principle, it seems positive that it discourages voting 
of borrowed shares generally, even though exceptions are available. 
However, several points are problematic. First, this code only covers one 
part of the entire risk-decoupling problem—that of securities lending. 
The Code seldom mentions the other aspects of the problem.251 Second, 
the Code of Conduct is only voluntary in character, and can be disre-
garded when a sufficient explanation is given.252  And third, after its 
adoption, the hedge fund community has become disappointed with its 
success. Only thirty-four hedge funds (out of a potential 1000 candi-
dates) signed up for it.253 Out of these thirty-four hedge funds, fourteen 
had initially been responsible for the project. These numbers have been 
noticed at a hearing in the House of Commons, which has drawn consid-
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erable attention.254 Overall, most parties agree that the Code is not a suc-
cessful project. 255  This unsuccessful attempt at self-regulation by the 
hedge fund industry has ultimately paved the way for regulation of the 
industry through the infamous EU directive on alternative investment 
funds.256 This directive, however, does not contain a single provision on 
the whole subject matter of risk decoupling.257 
Specifically for the field of securities lending, legislative inactivity 
may lead to other, unwanted consequences. Where self-regulation at-
tempts do not bear fruit, securities lenders will lose their confidence in 
the market altogether, and thus reconsider their lending business. Evi-
dence supporting this development has already surfaced: A number of 
lenders have started to appoint a special supervisor to ensure that the se-
curities they lend out are given to responsible business participants.258 
Others, in particular institutional lenders, are reported to have stopped 
their lending business altogether.259 
Whether this trend is indeed affirmed may be doubted. The incen-
tives for lenders appear too lucrative, and they stand too rationally apa-
thetic towards an exercise of their voting rights.260 
The data provided by the National Association of Pension Funds 
(NAPF) has shown that the lending business of British pension funds has 
remained relatively stable between 2006-2011, and even increased dur-
ing 2011. In 2011, only 21% of surveyed pension funds stated that they 
would never lend any shares. In 2010, the figure had been 47%. The pro-
portion of funds that never call back shares at a vote has increased signif-
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Table 2: Securities Lending Activity by Pension Funds in the  
United Kingdom 
 
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Never lend stock 36% 41% 25% 44% 47% 21% 
Do carry out lending 
activity 
64% 59% 75% 56% 53% 79% 
Recall stock for conten-
tious resolutions only 
41% 36% 34% 29% 32% 38% 
Recall stock for all  
resolutions 
3%   4% 9% 3% 3% 
Never recall stock 20% 23% 33% 18% 16% 28% 
Don’t know     4%   3% 10% 
       
Number of respondents 39 39 53 45 38 39 
       
Source: NAPF Engagement Surveys: pension funds’ engagement with 
companies 2006-2011; own calculations 
3. Conclusion 
The option to do nothing would liberalize the relationship between 
shares and voting rights. It is doubtful whether this approach is adequate 
for this subject matter. None of the self-regulation approaches presented 
here have been ultimately successful. Furthermore, it must be noted that 
the market does not seem positioned to properly price a separation of risk 
and voting rights. 
B. Ban and Restriction 
At the opposite end of the regulatory strategy spectrum lies the pos-
sibility of banning risk decoupling, either comprehensively or partly. In 
view of the fundamental problems and high costs that result from risk 
decoupling, this may seem a palatable approach to the phenomenon. 
1. Ban on Decoupling 
In academic circles, U.S. scholars Robert Thompson and Paul 
Edelman have advocated the option of banning risk-decoupling strate-
gies.261 Both scholars propose to introduce a comprehensive and manda-
                                                      
 261. Thompson & Edelman, supra note 182. 
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tory “one share, one vote” standard, supporting a ban on agreements that 
would circumvent or decouple this standard and ultimately favor an ex-
plicit restriction on vote buying.262 These claims are supported by a theo-
ry that understands corporate voting as a mechanism of error correction 
for management decisions.263 The authors reject less restrictive solutions, 
which they argue are inadequate. 
The suggestion of banning risk-decoupling strategies has appeared 
in discussions over possible reform in the form of the European Trans-
parency Directive.264 The Mazars report commissioned by the European 
Commission, recommends the adoption of a ban as the only truly effec-
tive solution. However, the report acknowledges that the Transparency 
Directive is probably not the right legal tool to effectuate such a ban.265 
The report distinguishes between two main strategies. The first is to re-
strict risk-decoupling phenomena, and the second is to ban risk-
decoupling phenomena. 
A classical strategy would be to require shareholders who have lent 
their shares to recall them before any general meeting. The report 
acknowledges, however, that there are limits to this option: first, it would 
be generally considered burdensome; second, it may be overreaching, as 
it would prevent stock lending at the time of the general meeting, where-
as it is not the stock lending per se which is wrong but rather the use of 
borrowed shares to vote; third, this option would only address empty vot-
ing based on stock lending and would thus be limited in scope.266 
A more radical system would be to ban empty voting altogether. In 
particular, voting with borrowed shares (or shares held under a tempo-
rary transfer agreement or pursuant to a scheme having a similar impact) 
could be prohibited. The report supports this solution as the most con-
sistent decision to be taken in view of the principles at stake.267 
Each variant of a regulation to ban, however, faces serious con-
cerns. 
First, any regulatory ban may be both under-inclusive and over-
inclusive. Every decision to ban a certain product is a two-dimensional 
black-and-white solution, which does not provide leeway for a nuanced 
response to the specific problem at stake in individual risk-decoupling 
situations. Either the risk-decoupling activity is permitted, or it is not, 
                                                      
 262. Id. at 158. 
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there is no ground for an intermediate solution. Differentiated responses 
developed through a holistic approach, with regard for the specific and 
individual problem at stake, are not impossible. Such a regulatory struc-
ture will not yield satisfactory responses where the problem is neither 
black nor white, but grey. This may be the case where shareholders have 
reduced their risk exposure with the help of derivatives only partially, but 
not entirely. In consequence, difficult questions arise about the exact lim-
its of this regime. Several questions remain: Should the ban only apply to 
situations where shareholders have reduced their risk entirely? How 
about situations where some residual risk remains? Which limit should 
apply to permissible hedging? 
The second concern over a statutory ban relates to enforcement.268 
A comprehensive ban on risk-decoupling structures will be difficult to 
control and enforce.269 This aspect has already been highlighted in the 
discussion of the one share, one vote standard a few years ago.270 The 
main problem is the possibility of circumventing the legally fixed regula-
tion. The financial industry is notoriously well known for inventing new 
products within ever narrowing horizons.271 In this way, new structures 
allow for the creation of economically similar results. Alternatively, op-
portunities for circumventing regulations arise where derivatives can be 
configured that do not reference the full value of the underlying securi-
ties, but rather only refer to several economic aspects of them, as is the 
case for some credit derivatives.272 In the alternative, derivatives could be 
designed to avoid referencing shares directly, and instead mention the 
company’s assets, which would economically create a similar effect. 
Furthermore, it is unclear how regulators could assure that a ban 
would not impede the economically legitimate and useful activities of a 
business. Both the trade with borrowed securities and the derivatives 
businesses undisputedly fulfill serve important functions on the capital 
markets.273 The objective of restricting risk-decoupling structures for rea-
sons of corporate governance risks catching innocent, and even desirable, 
situations, and thus becoming destructive and inefficient overall. To be 
sure, this problem could be addressed by utilizing various regulatory op-
tions. For instance, regulators could implement de minimis thresholds, 
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the surpassing of which would trigger the ban, or they might design per-
son-related regulation, which only captures already existing sharehold-
ers. Nevertheless, a prohibitive system will always risk being over-
inclusive, and thus hit economically desirable activities. 
The British investment fund Hermes proposed a regulatory regime 
that should address the problem of voting with borrowed shares. Accord-
ing to Hermes, such an activity should be counted as market manipula-
tion.274 This solution surely would have the advantage of not directly 
banning securities lending or restricting them in any way; it would only 
target the exercise of the voting rights. Nevertheless, this proposal has 
been heavily criticized. In 2004–2005, an independent investigation in 
the United Kingdom reported that such a regime would be highly im-
practical.275 According to Lord Myners, the chairman of the investiga-
tion, the fungibility of shares is the central problem, which makes the 
enforcement of the ban close to impossible. Lord Myners compared the 
situation with the payment of a check while insisting that the paid money 
should not be invested in the defense industry.276 Other than Myners, 
commentators and practitioners do not see a basis for, and acknowledge 
practical obstacles for, a prohibition in the sense of the proposal by Her-
mes.277 Moreover, it has been pointed out that this proposal addresses 
only part of the entire risk-decoupling dimension and would not extend 
to an equally effective derivatives structure.278 
2. Difficulties for the Record Date Problem 
Finally, proponents of a prohibitive regulation must accept that an 
implementation of such a regulation, albeit difficult to achieve, would be 
theoretically possible for risk-decoupling structures that rely on the usage 
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of derivatives and securities lending. However, it appears virtually un-
workable for the third of the categories—the exploitation of the record 
date capture.279 If our legal frameworks intend to retain the record date 
system in principle, it will be inevitable to see a certain level of diver-
gence between economic interest and voting power. This is simply be-
cause the record date and general meeting are separated by a certain—
longer or shorter—time period. A prohibition would correspondingly be 
at odds with the entire system, unless the record date system as a whole 
is called into question. It lies in this logic that the Mazars report, dis-
cussed above, modifies its call for a prohibition when turning to the issue 
of record date capture. The report advises that lenders of securities 
should be legally required to call back their shares before the record 
date.280 Admittedly, however, such a solution would be subject to signifi-
cant objections. As their proponents accept, such an obligation would be 
seriously intrusive on the contractual freedom of market participants. 
Moreover, it can be argued that it would be an inconsistent intrusion be-
cause the problem does not lie in borrowing the shares at the moment of 
the general meeting, but rather in voting with borrowed shares. Finally, 
the solution only captures part of the risk-decoupling problem (in form of 
record date capture) and not the deeper issues of share lending more gen-
erally and the use of derivatives.281 Beyond these arguments, the Europe-
an Securities Markets Expert Group (ESME) has raised even more seri-
ous objections. ESME argues that any positive obligation to call back 
shares ahead of each general meeting would potentially be disruptive to 
the market because it may result in the loss of liquidity in a certain stock 
during the general meeting season.282 
Even if the obligation to call back lent shares is diluted into a legal 
possibility to call them back, it is doubtful such a move would be suc-
cessful. This is because the collective action problem on the part of the 
lenders, as described above in detail,283 does not give them any incentive 
to actually recall the shares. Quite the contrary, a rational lender would 
actually not recall the shares.284 
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C. Transparency 
Among the solutions proposed for responding to risk-decoupling 
strategies, transparency plays a key role. In the pages that follow, I argue 
that transparency is indeed an adequate means to tackle the economic 
problems associated with risk decoupling; on this basis, a legislative pro-
posal can be developed. 
1. Transparency as a Response to Decoupling Problems 
As I have shown above, the key problem underlying risk-
decoupling structures today is their lack of transparency.285 In particular, 
information costs for shareholders and external investors are high be-
cause risk-decoupling structures are not disclosed to the market. Agency 
costs are incurred without the market knowing the level of risk exposure 
company actors face. Risk-decoupled shares are not priced adequately, 
which differs from other instruments that attempt to overcome the debt-
equity divide, such as preference shares, due to a lack of transparency.286 
In addition, a disclosure obligation would most certainly deter 
hedge funds and other savvy investors from entering into risk-decoupling 
structures in the first place. That is, the private benefits that are pursued 
and the agency costs that are produced are only seen as an attractive 
business model for some market actors for the very reason that they can 
be pursued unnoticed on the market. Disclosing these strategies could 
result in negative reputational consequences. Moreover, other sharehold-
er groups can react: they can form alliances, propose counter-measures, 
etcetera; and ultimately they can sell—the strongest and easiest reaction 
to a problem in the company. 
Finally, we have seen that one of the current problems with risk de-
coupling is that many regulators across the world are unsure about the 
extent of their occurrence in daily life. An obligation to disclose risk-
decoupling structures would give regulators an idea of their pervasive-
ness in practice and would help to assess the case to take additional steps. 
The idea of responding to the risk-decoupling phenomenon with in-
creased disclosure obligations thus has strong appeal. In addition to these 
initial reflections, information and disclosure obligations are always a 
less restrictive regulatory intervention when compared with prohibition 
laws. This choice of legal instrument would therefore also be preferable 
under proportionality considerations.287 Not surprisingly, therefore, many 
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commentators in academia and practice have advocated for a transparen-
cy-based solution to the problems described in this article. In particular, 
the early, tentative comments from the literature suggested—due to the 
still prevailing uncertainty about the extent, significance, and weightiness 
of the issue—to tighten transparency requirements as an initial step.288 
These commentators hoped for a gentle and cautious approach to the 
problem and expected to gain access to more information in order to 
measure the extent of risk-decoupling activity in the market and to assess 
potential follow-up measures.289 
2. Legislative Activity 
In the first instance, lawmakers have reacted by realizing that the 
disclosure system plays a key role in the overall problem. For example, 
France was among the first jurisdictions to respond to the perceived emp-
ty voting problem by modifying its existing disclosure law in 2010. The 
new provision addresses the problem of risk decoupling in the form of 
securities lending.290 A law enacted on October 22, 2010,291 inserted a 
new article, Article L225-126, into the Code de commerce.292 The article 
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stipulates that every shareholder holding borrowed shares, or shares from 
a similar transaction, that surpasses 0.5% of the voting rights of the issu-
er must disclose this fact to the issuer and to the French supervisor 
Autorité des Marchés Financiers (AMF).293 During the legislative pro-
cess, the 0.5% threshold has been very controversial and modified sever-
al times.294 The disclosure obligation arises at least three days before the 
date of the general meeting, provided that the lending agreement is still 
in force on the day of the general meeting.295 In addition to the number of 
shares acquired by way of this transaction, the disclosure needs to in-
clude: the identity of the lender and details about the expiry date of the 
agreement, its way of operation, and a voting agreement, if any.296 Final-
ly, the issuer has to publish the information.297 
Moreover, the new regime provides for drastic sanctions. If the bor-
rower does not comply with the disclosure obligation, the shares will lose 
their voting entitlement at the general meeting.298 In addition, a court can 
separately prohibit the exercise of the voting right of a noncomplying 
shareholder for up to five years. Finally, a shareholder resolution that 
involved a noncomplying shareholder can be challenged in court and 
declared invalid.299 This legislative reform draws on the original sugges-
tions of a working group appointed by the AMF and chaired by Yves 
Mansion.300 
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The choice of a reference date as the third day before the general 
meeting corresponds to the French record date.301 In this way, the de-
scribed reform intends to include all temporarily held shares at the mo-
ment of the record date and to disclose them to the market. The French 
business world has accepted this reform, and French institutions have 
suggested that their new law should serve as a blueprint for a potential 
European reform directive.302 
The French approach is a first step, but there are several objections. 
First, it is obvious that the French law deals with only part of the prob-
lem: the risk-decoupling problem in the form of securities lending. Be-
cause several other decoupling strategies are not included in the regime, 
the law facilitates arbitrage strategies. In particular, using derivatives for 
risk- decoupling does not fall under the scope of the French system, and 
even the potentially problematic trading of shares between the record 
date and the general meeting remains unregulated.303 Several other as-
pects of the new regime are questionable. While the sanction of disen-
franchisement applies only where disclosure is omitted, it is not tied to 
an abuse of the voting right. This has two important implications. First, 
the regulation seems to allow and even to legitimize the lending and bor-
rowing of shares over the record date (including voting right); the heavy 
sanction of disenfranchisement applies only where the duty of disclosure 
is not complied with. Moreover, the choice of a very low disclosure 
threshold seems flawed because, with a borrowed stake of 0.5% of the 
voting rights, the potential for abuse of a risk-decoupled position—
described above—seems very unlikely to materialize. Second, it seems 
questionable whether the one-off disclosure duty on the record date gives 
market participants sufficient information to respond. All of these issues 
will be revisited in the pages that follow—the proposal section of this 
Article.304 
Beyond this French advance, the European Commission increasing-
ly sees a necessity for an EU-wide transparency obligation. Released by 
the EU Commission in 2010, the consultation paper on Corporate Gov-
ernance in Financial Institutions carefully attempts to first ask whether 
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greater transparency as to the identity of shareholders could help reduce 
the risk of risk-decoupling structures. 305  The majority of respondents 
support the call for enhanced transparency, for example, in the realm of 
securities lending.306 At the same time, it had been pointed out that the 
introduction of a general disclosure obligation would not be an adequate 
means to solve the entire problem, as it does not focus on the cardinal 
point of the record date.307 So far, the review process and this suggestion 
have not triggered any legislative activity. 
The consultation paper has displaced the topic from the scope of 
company law to the field of capital markets disclosure duties. EU offi-
cials from the latter area at first graciously accepted the invitation and 
seemed positive about bolstering regulation. This was the reaction to a 
conference on the reform of the (capital markets oriented) Transparency 
Directive, which was held in Brussels on June 11, 2010.308 Building up 
on an external report,309 a subsequently published EU working document 
on the reform of the Transparency Directive310 discussed various legisla-
tive options: 
(1) The first option would require borrowers of shares to disclose 
and specify that they hold their shares as borrower (or, more gener-
ally, under a temporary transfer agreement). This would be a simple 
solution, but, as the Commission acknowledges itself, it would not 
address all decoupling issues.311 
(2) Specifically addressing the problem of record date capture, the 
Commission discussed whether to introduce a requirement that any 
sale of shares above a certain threshold (or other reduction in the net 
economic exposure of a shareholder of record) between the record 
date and the date of the general meeting should be immediately no-
tified to the issuer and to the market in such a way that the relevant 
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information is fully disclosed prior to the date of the general meet-
ing.312 
(3) Another solution would be to require the shareholders to imme-
diately disclose any change, above a certain threshold, in their net 
economic exposure within a certain period of time before and up to 
a general meeting of shareholders (for instance, during the thirty 
days preceding a general meeting). This requirement would provide 
a complete picture of the shareholder base at the time when the in-
formation is most meaningful. The Commission acknowledges that 
such a system would be comprehensive—indeed, it would comprise 
and go beyond proposal (2)—but that it may be viewed as too bur-
densome.313 
(4) Another way to improve transparency would be to require, as 
proposed in the Mazars Study,314 that the economic exposure of all 
shareholders, above a certain threshold, be disclosed on the day of 
the record date, to the extent this net economic exposure was not 
disclosed pursuant to a previous notification (no double notification 
should be required if it does not provide new information). This sys-
tem would be comprehensive and would not be equally burdensome 
because only one extra notification would be required (subject to 
updates, which should be limited).315 
(5) Finally, the European Corporate Governance Forum (the Fo-
rum), an advisory body to the Commission, proposed in its February 
2010 statement that a borrower of shares should notify the company 
prior to the general meeting that he does not have the full financial 
interest in the shares if he intends to exercise his voting rights on the 
shares. According to the Forum, this duty to notify should apply to 
positions that correspond to a certain threshold, for example, 1% or 
more of the outstanding shares with voting rights. Any false or 
omitted statement in this context should be dealt with under the na-
tional rules on misleading information. Furthermore, the Forum 
recommends introducing a rule that the company and its subsidiar-
ies may only lend the company’s own shares if the lending contract 
stipulates these shares will not be voted upon by the borrower. The 
company should disclose prior to the general meeting to what extent 
                                                      
 312. Id. at ¶ 10.15; see MAZARS & MARCCUS PARTNERS, supra note 47, at 131. 
 313. Commission Staff Working Document, supra note 310, at ¶ 10.20. 
 314. MAZARS & MARCCUS PARTNERS, supra note 47, at 131. 
 315. Commission Staff Working Document, supra note 310, at ¶ 10.21. 
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it and its subsidiaries have lent the company’s own shares to third 
parties.316 
Overall, none of the papers specifically define what constitutes “net 
economic exposure.” Deducing the writers’ intentions, we can assume 
the term refers to the risk a shareholder factually bears with respect to a 
particular stake in the company, that which results from the regular (posi-
tive) risk and the reduced (negative) risk, as potentially following from 
risk-decoupling mechanisms. In the normal scenario, where a sharehold-
er only holds (long) shares, without additionally having entered into 
hedging transactions, the net economic exposure will correspond to the 
positive share position. Where the long position coincides with deriva-
tives transactions in one of the described ways,317 this exposure can, 
however, be reduced. It is important to understand that the Commission’s 
reasoning seems to be based on the fact that borrowed shares only in-
crease the positive risk, but not the net risk exposure. However, commen-
tators have rightly pointed out that the decisive information relates to the 
relationship between voting rights held by the shareholder and the net 
economic exposure, the latter alone being little meaningful.318  To be 
sure, the positive risk exposure is to be disclosed according to the regular 
disclosure rules for large shareholdings,319 so that—according to the ob-
vious reasoning by the Commission—the joint information between the-
se two items (long and net short exposure) will yield the decisive infor-
mation value. In other words, the net economic exposure is only an addi-
tional, ancillary piece of information. 
The outlined proposals by the Commission and the European Cor-
porate Governance Forum were part of the consultation on the reform of 
the Transparency Directive, which was initiated in May of 2010.320 The 
responses by the consultation participants disagreed on how to respond to 
this specific problem, which proved inconclusive. Many advocated in 
                                                      
 316. European Corp. Governance Forum, Statement on Empty Voting and Transparency of 
Shareholder Positions (Feb. 20 2010), at ¶ 5; see Commission Staff Working Document, supra note 
310, at ¶ 10.22. 
 317. See supra Part III.C.1. 
 318 . Andreas Merkner & Marco Sustmann, Wertpapierleihe und Empty Voting – Weiter-
gehender Transparenzbedarf im WpHG?, NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT [NZG] 
1170, 1174 (2010). 
 319. Transparency Directive 2004/109/EC, art. 9, 2004 O.J. 109 (EC). 
 320. Consultation Document on the Modernisation of the Directive 2004/109/EC on the Har-
monisation of Transparency Requirements in Relation to Information About Issuers Whose Securi-
ties are Admitted to Trading on a Regulated Market (2010) EC (May 27, 2010). 
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favor of more research and factual evaluation.321 Following up on these 
preparatory steps, the Commission published its official proposal in Oc-
tober 2011.322 Utilizing the feedback received, the proposal did not con-
tain a direct response to the issue of empty voting—the subject matter of 
interest. The proposal includes rules for the twin problems of positive 
decoupling323 (in particular, hidden stake building with the help of con-
tracts for difference),324 but it does not address “empty voting” as an ex-
ample for negative risk decoupling mechanisms. At the same time, the 
center of legal policy was transferred from the Commission to ESMA, 
the new European market supervisor. The latter body published a “Call 
for Evidence” in September of 2011 in order to evaluate the case for reg-
ulatory intervention in this field.325 This document cites the preparatory 
work completed by the Commission and the inconclusiveness with re-
spect to a possible regulatory response.326 At the same time, it emphasiz-
es the need to strive for a comprehensive solution to the problem.327 In 
December of 2011, several responses prompted by the consultation were 
published.328 After a thorough investigation, ESMA concluded in June of 
2012 that there was no case for regulatory intervention for time being.329 
The ball is back in the Commission’s field, and the reforms of the Trans-
parency Directive are still pending. 
3. Costs and Critique 
The introduction of new disclosure obligations is always accompa-
nied by additional costs. The most obvious costs are so-called compli-
ance costs, which are simply caused by complying with the new obliga-
tions. In addition, we can expect that efforts to access information about 
new rules, to make them known within a company, and to implement 
                                                      
 321. Commission Feedback Statement on the Summary of Responses to the Consultation by 
DG Internal Market and Services on the Modernisation of the Transparency Directive 
(2004/109/EC), 23 (Dec. 17, 2010) [hereinafter Feedback Statement]. 
 322. Commission Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 
Amending Directive 2004/109/EC on the Harmonisation of Transparency Requirements in Relation 
to Information About Issuers Whose Securities are Admitted to Trading on a Regulated Market and 
Commission Directive 2007/14/EC, COM (2011) 683 (Oct. 25, 2011), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/securities/docs/transparency/modifying-proposal/20111025-
provisional-proposal_en.pdf. 
 323. See id. at 20 (draft modification of Article 13). 
 324. See Kettunen & Ringe, supra note 9, at 227. 
 325. ESMA, ESMA/2011/288, CALL FOR EVIDENCE – EMPTY VOTING (2011); see Kelleher, 
supra note 151, at 3. 
 326. ESMA, supra note 325, at para. 9-10. 
 327. Id. at para. 8-12. 
 328. Call for Evidence on Empty Voting, supra note 133 (containing these responses). 
 329. ESMA, supra note 132. 
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them are costly. Beyond these firm-level costs, legislative activity itself 
creates costs: resources are spent and civil servants are employed to de-
velop new rules and to monitor compliance. In this particular context, 
opportunity costs are crucial, including the cost measured in terms of the 
value of alternatives that are forgone and not chosen. 
On the other hand, a new system will create indirect costs. For ex-
ample, avoidance costs, which are notoriously difficult to quantify. Issu-
ers will be able to avoid securities regulation by not going public. If a 
company refrains from an Initial Public Offering because of legal re-
quirements that are too far-reaching, and if the company in question ac-
cordingly foregoes an otherwise optimal method of financing, then, from 
an overall welfare perspective, costs will emerge, which are empirically 
difficult to quantify.330 In our case, for example, if market participants 
were to refrain from many securities lending transactions because of new 
disclosure laws, market liquidity would be seriously impeded.331 Further, 
indirect costs could result from the disincentive of hedge funds initiating 
investigations on potential targets. These investigations are useful for the 
development of efficient capital markets and provide signals to other 
market participants.332 
Any exercise that aims to quantify costs arising from regulation 
faces issues of evaluation. Without going into details here, it is important 
to bear in mind that costs are created even by seemingly harmless disclo-
sure obligations. For instance, choosing a relatively high, initial disclo-
sure threshold could counterbalance some of the issues raised above. 
Where disclosure of everyday transactions below a threshold would not 
be required, the costs could be kept to a minimum. Equally, disclosure 
would then only really target those situations that potentially lead to po-
tential governance problems.333 
4. Key Issues of a Transparency Regime 
Considering the advantages and direct and indirect costs of a dis-
closure system provides us with the ability develop a regime that in-
cludes certain key features. 
                                                      
 330. See Christian Leuz, Was the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 Really this Costly? A Discussion 
of Evidence from Event Returns and Going-Private Decisions, 44 J. ACCT. & ECON. 146 (2007). 
 331. ESME, supra note 47. 
 332. See Financial Services Authority, Disclosure of Contracts for Differences, Consultation 
and Draft Handbook Text, (CP 07/20) annex 1, ¶ 39 (2007); see also Gilson & Kraakman, Mecha-
nisms, supra note 91. 
 333. See FSA, supra note 332, at annex 1, para. 43. 
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a. Subject Matter and Addressee 
First and foremost, it is important to consider the question of what, 
precisely, should be disclosed. Common to all the constellations dis-
cussed above are the existing shareholders that engage in risk decoupling 
and thereby create costs for their fellow shareholders and for (external) 
investors. A regulatory response needs to ensure that all relevant constel-
lations, but also all potentially future cases, are caught. This response 
requires that we develop a general clause that could encompass all rele-
vant and known constellations. The law might stipulate a nonexhaustive 
list of examples, which could be a more concrete option. A general 
clause of this nature needs to be wide enough to cover parallel, future, 
and not yet known strategies, however. 
According to the findings shown above, the key problem arises 
when: (1) existing shareholders reduce the risk inherent in their shares; 
and (2) market participants hold their shareholder position only tempo-
rarily, for example over the record date. Both situations have to be in-
cluded in a regulatory response. Common to both is the fact that share-
holders do not bear full risk. By contrast, a regulatory rule should not 
encompass nonshareholders who acquire a purely negative interest in 
shares. This rule could concern investors who engage in short selling 
over certain securities. It is true that these investors are financially inter-
ested in a negative development of the share price, but the situation is not 
comparable with the circumstances of interest here. A nonshareholder is 
neither able to influence the voting outcomes of the general meeting in 
the same way as shareholders, nor able to threaten to use his influence in 
such a way. The possibility of an intra-company manipulation does not 
exist in the same manner. 
Equally, it follows from the discussion that this paper is not con-
cerned with pure potential conflicts of interest that result from a share-
holder’s stake in a competitor. Recall that this was the case in the Mylan-
Perry situation,334 but it is not the specific problem of interest here. In 
this instance, we expect that these conflicts will be evened out by random 
distribution. On the other hand, the fact that shareholders hold a stake in 
a competing company is a traditional conflict of interest, which is of an 
entirely different quality than the problems analyzed here. Told different-
ly, the problem of interest here does not result from the conflict of inter-
est, but rather from the distorted incentive underlying the voting right. 
We will accordingly target the latter because other areas of corporate law 
specifically dealing with conflicts of interest address the former. 
                                                      
 334. See supra text accompanying note 29. 
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b. Disclosure Frequency 
The success of a disclosure regime is dependent upon the appropri-
ate moment at which disclosure is fixed to occur. Only timely disclosure 
will allow market participants to react appropriately. 
Several options are feasible. On the one hand, the disclosure obliga-
tion could be designed in relation to an event—for instance, the obliga-
tion of disclosure arises before the record date335 or a general meeting.336 
Alternatively, the disclosure obligation could only be applicable to those 
shareholders who request an item to be placed on the agenda of the gen-
eral meeting or who request a general meeting be held.337 On the other 
hand, the obligation of disclosure could be continuous and steady, trig-
gered whenever a specific and relevant event occurs. 
Overall, the latter option—continuous disclosure—is preferable. A 
singular disclosure obligation leading up to the moment of a general 
meeting would surely place a minimal burden on investors. Moreover, 
information on the risk exposure of shareholders is most relevant in the 
context of the general meeting. After all, it is only at this moment that the 
much-discussed distortion of voting incentives becomes relevant and 
concrete. 
Nevertheless, three main reasons support a continuous disclosure 
obligation over the entire business year. First, it is important to consider 
the short timeframe during which shareholders are expected to adequate-
ly respond to disclosed information. If publication occurs only briefly 
before the general meeting, many shareholders will not be able to react 
promptly.338 For example, it will not be possible for shareholders to form 
a viable opposition against the goals proposed by the risk-decoupled 
hedge funds. This will certainly be relevant when a disclosure obligation 
exists immediately before the general meeting, or before the record date. 
After the record date, shareholders are no longer able to acquire voting 
                                                      
 335. See Luca Enriques, Conference on the Operation of the Transparency Directive (June 11, 
2010); cf. supra text accompanying note 289 (discussing the French law reform from 2010 concern-
ing securities lending). 
 336. See Deutscher Investor Relations Verband e.V., Response of Deutscher Investor Relations 
Verband e.V. (German Investor Relations Association) to the EU Commission’s Public Consultation 
on the Revision of the Transparency Directive 10 (Aug. 23, 2010), available at 
https://circabc.europa.eu/sd/d/b5aff1c8-0a3d-46a9-b41a-cc6e049d7f59/German_Investor_Relations_ 
Association_en.pdf. 
 337. This will, of course, be subject to the usual hurdles for convening a general meeting. On 
such a proposal, see Eumedion, Position Paper on the Consequences of Synthetic Structures for 
Dutch Securities Law and Company Law 10 (Nov. 17, 2008). 
 338. See, e.g., Jean-François Biard, Proposition de Loi Relative au Régime des Prêts Emprunts 
de Titres, REVUE DE DROIT BANCAIRE ET FINANCIER 155 (2010) (relating to the French reform, as 
discussed above). 
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rights; the resistance of regular shareholders who wish to acquire more 
shares is no longer an issue. As a consequence, there would be a dra-
matic “exit,” that is, the sale of shares on a big scale. This sale would 
likely trigger a massive decline of the share price that would not concern 
the risk-decoupled shareholder in any way. Quite the contrary, a large-
scale exit of shareholders would even exacerbate the risk-decoupling 
problem because these activities would create fresh disparities between 
voting entitlements and share ownership. 
Second, and more importantly, the process of voting at the general 
meeting is not alone crucial for the effects of risk-decoupling strategies. 
At this point it is important to reconsider the previous discussions of 
agency and information costs.339 As explained above, the costs created by 
risk-decoupling strategies are incurred at any time, throughout the entire 
business year. The threat of calling a meeting is one of several options 
hedge funds have at any given time. Otherwise, a risk-decoupled investor 
can informally influence the management at any moment, even on an 
unofficial basis. 
Especially for institutional investors and hedge funds, these infor-
mal ways of influencing companies, coupled with the threat of exercising 
their voting power, are often much more important than the vote itself. A 
constant dialogue, away from the public, will pressure the administration 
to act in a certain way. This type of influence is always available during 
and outside of the general meeting. By exercising this power, a risk-
decoupled shareholder puts considerable pressure on other shareholders 
and potential investors alike, both outside the formal meeting and during 
the entire business year. 
Third and relatedly, in some situations the written consent of share-
holders can replace formal resolutions. For example, according to Dela-
ware law, if the majority consents in writing, action can be taken without 
a meeting.340 The same or similar rules exist in several jurisdictions.341 
c. Disclosure Threshold 
It follows from the analysis that relatively high disclosure thresh-
olds are required for an adequate and balanced disclosure regime. This 
goes hand-in-hand with the assertion that a continuous disclosure obliga-
tion is needed. If we require market participants to disclose their negative 
                                                      
 339. See supra Parts IV.1–IV.2. 
 340. DEL. CODE § 228 (2009). 
 341. JAY W. EISENHOFER & MICHAEL K. BARRY, SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM HANDBOOK 9-8.1 
(2011). 
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interest at all times, we need another filter to single out meaningful dis-
closure information. 
It appears that a reasonably high threshold, such as 5%, is appropri-
ate for several reasons. First, it would better serve the purpose identified 
here; we are concerned with shareholders who hold a particular stake but 
at the same time have reduced or eliminated their risk. Only the kind of 
stake accumulated in the first instance will give a shareholder the neces-
sary voting power to influence the target company, and only a sufficient-
ly high risk elimination will distort her incentives in a meaningful way. 
Take, for example, a 10% long shareholder who has reduced her risk ex-
posure by one percentage point. She will still be risk-exposed to 9% of 
the share capital, which is not a significant distortion. The shareholder 
will not be induced to pervert her shares for a dramatic purpose. It can be 
argued that significant clout is needed, around 5% of the issued share 
capital, or more. 
Second, a high threshold conforms to our goal of minimizing the 
administrative costs for market participants.342 Low threshold disclosure 
rules risk being over-inclusive and force the disclosure of harmless trad-
ing activity, which is not intended to influence corporate governance ar-
rangements within a company. In particular, institutional investors might 
easily cross lower thresholds through normal trading positions.343 
Third, too frequent disclosure of a short position is the downside of 
encouraging market overreactions. It may trigger herd behavior or accel-
erate downward movements. That is, if short positions are frequently 
disclosed, unsophisticated investors are more likely to sell in response to 
seeing a more sophisticated investor with a short position, exacerbating 
market declines.344 Finally, the circumstances could reduce market li-
quidity because investors do not like to reveal their short positions to 
companies. Thus, these investors prefer to avoid taking short positions 
altogether. 
                                                      
 342. Cf. IOSCO TECHNICAL COMM., REGULATION OF SHORT SELLING – FINAL REPORT, at 
para. 3.23.5 (2009). 
 343. In the particular context of short selling disclosure, see Reflections on the New Pan-
European Regime for Short Selling and Credit Default Swaps, HERBERT SMITH 4 (Feb. 2012), 
http://www.herbertsmithfreehills.com/-/media/HS/L230212219.pdf. On short selling disclosure 
generally, see infra Part V.C.5. 
 344. EUR. PARL. COMM. ON ECONOMIC & MONETARY AFFAIRS, REPORT ON THE PROPOSAL 
FOR A REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL ON SHORT SELLING AND 
CERTAIN ASPECTS OF CREDIT DEFAULT SWAPS 45 (2009). 
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5. Coordination with Transparency of Short Selling 
In early 2012, the EU institutions adopted a regulation on short sell-
ing.345 Following protracted negotiations,346 they agreed on a regulation 
that introduced a pan-European regulatory approach to short selling.347 In 
essence, the proposal follows previous work done by CESR 348  and 
IOSCO.349 350 The new regime provides for a two-tiered transparency 
system, encompassing all net short positions that can arise not only 
through short sales, but also through the use of various derivatives.351 
The threshold values are 0.2% for a disclosure to the respective national 
supervisory authority and 0.5% for public release (in both cases plus 0.1 
percentage point increments).352 The net short position shall be deter-
mined on each trading day at midnight and is to be reported by 3:30 p.m. 
on the following day.353 Originally, the EU Commission had also intend-
ed that any short sale orders in the daily operations should be labeled as 
such in order to distinguish them from regular sales orders (flagging 
principle).354 This area was not included in the final text of the regula-
tion, however. 
                                                      
 345. Short selling has been associated during the 2007–2008 crisis with a negative role, alleg-
edly exacerbating a downward trend in the market. See, e.g., Letter from International Organization 
of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) to the G20 (Nov. 12, 2008), available at 
http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD282.pdf. Generally, on the economic role of 
short sales, see ESME, POSITION ON SHORT SELLING (2009), available at http://ec.europa.eu/inter 
nal_market/securities/docs/esme/report_20090319_en.pdf. 
 346. See Commission Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of The Coun-
cil on Short Selling and Certain Aspects of Credit Default Swaps, COM (2010) 482 final (Sept. 15 
2010) [hereinafter Commission Proposal]; Council Proposal for a Regulation of the European Par-
liament and of the Council on Short Selling and Certain Aspects of Credit Default Swaps – Text 
Provisionally Agreed with the European Parliament, Council Document 16338/11 (Nov. 4, 2011) 
[hereinafter Council Proposal]. On the various drafts, see Emilios Avgouleas, The Regulation of 
Short Sales Revisited, L. & FIN. MARKETS REV. 333 (2011). 
 347. Regulation 236/2012, of the European Parliament and the European Council of 14 March 
2012 on Short Selling and Certain Aspects of Credit Default Swaps, O.J. (L 86) 1 [hereinafter Short 
Selling Regulation]. 
 348. The Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR), is the predecessor of the new 
European regulatory body ESMA. See supra note 130. 
 349. IOSCO is the International Organization of Securities Commissions. 
 350. CESR, MODEL FOR A PAN-EUROPEAN SHORT SELLING DISCLOSURE REGIME, CESR/10-
088 (2010); IOSCO TECHNICAL COMM., supra note 342. 
 351. Short Selling Regulation, supra note 347, at recital 10; see Commission Proposal, supra 
note 346, at 6; Council Proposal, supra note 346, recitals 6, 9. 
 352. Short Selling Regulation, supra note 347, at arts. 5(1)-(2), 6(1)-(2). 
 353. Id. at art. 9(2). 
 354. Commission Proposal, supra note 346, at art. 6; see also CESR, Proposal for a Pan-
European Short Selling Disclosure Regime, at paras 18–20 (CESR, Consultation Paper 09-581, 
2009) (flagging is already required in certain jurisdictions such as Australia, Canada, Japan, Hong 
Kong and the United States). 
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Overall, the Commission expects the new harmonized transparency 
requirements to ensure information on short positions is provided to reg-
ulators and that the market is complete and accurate.355 Article 3(1) of 
the regulation defines a short position as follows: 
(1) For the purposes of this Regulation, a position resulting from ei-
ther of the following shall be considered to be a short position relat-
ing to issued share capital or issued sovereign debt: 
(a) a short sale of a share issued by a company or of a debt instru-
ment issued by a sovereign issuer; 
(b) entering into a transaction which creates or relates to a financial 
instrument other than an instrument referred to in point (a) where 
the effect or one of the effects of the transaction is to confer a finan-
cial advantage on the natural or legal person entering into that trans-
action in the event of a decrease in the price or value of the share or 
debt instrument.356 
The definition is an attempt to capture all positions that give their 
holder a negative interest in shares. Of the various constellations exam-
ined in this paper, securities lending alone is not captured. In contrast to 
the original version of the Commission proposal, the regulation explicitly 
does not cover repurchase agreements (repos), derivatives, or securities 
lending.357 
For the purpose of the current inquiry, it is important to note that 
the new EU regime (along with other international efforts) approaches 
the issue of net short positions from a market stability perspective. This 
accounts for the way the regime introduces relatively low thresholds and 
for the disclosure of net values. However, the low initial threshold values 
of net 0.2% and 0.5% have attracted criticism. Market participants have 
expressed concern over institutional investors, who invest in small or 
medium-sized enterprises, because they may often exceed the values rel-
atively quickly.358 Accordingly, the Committee on Legal Affairs of the 
European Parliament called to raise the threshold to 1%.359 As a conse-
quence of these criticisms, the regulation now expressly provides for the 
possibility that the Commission has the power to adjust the thresholds to 
                                                      
 355. Commission Proposal, supra note 346, at 7. 
 356. Short Selling Regulation, supra note 347, at art. 3(1). 
 357. See id. at recital 17 & art. 2(1)(b). 
 358 . Reflections on the New Pan-European Regime for Short Selling and Credit Default 
Swaps, supra note 343, at 4. 
 359 . EUR. PARL., A7/0055/2011, REPORT ON THE PROPOSAL FOR A REGULATION OF THE 
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL ON SHORT SELLING AND CERTAIN ASPECTS OF 
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market realities if necessary, as prompted by ESMA.360 The other prob-
lem is the omission of securities lending from the scope of the regulation. 
Overall, the thrust of the regulation does not correspond to the regu-
latory goals defined in this paper. Risk decoupling does not approach the 
problem from the market stability perspective, but instead it considers 
corporate governance and investor protection central. As seen above, this 
implies that a disclosure regulation that aims to remedy risk decoupling 
will have features that diverge considerably from the Short Selling Regu-
lation. 
6. Further Specifications 
The following additional suggestions to a disclosure regime are rel-
evant given the comparison to the short selling regime. 
a. Gross Position Disclosure 
Different from the short selling regime, a disclosure regulation of 
risk-decoupling strategies would have to reflect gross positions and re-
frain from automatic netting. This reality is based on the following con-
siderations. 
As indicated above, the Short Selling Regulation and the risk-
decoupling issues presented here rely on different fundamental values. 
The financial crisis of 2008–2009 inspired the regulation of short sales, 
and the regulations primarily targeted short sales that may be susceptible 
to manipulation, investor confidence, and the overall stability of the fi-
nancial markets.361 Lawmakers have been mainly concerned with price 
stability affected by several activities: (1) the frequent use of short sell-
ing; (2) an increased supply of securities in circulation as a result of short 
sales and thus a self-fulfilling prophecy of falling prices; and (3) the 
temptation of short sellers to accelerate price decline through a targeted 
distribution of negative information and even higher price reductions.362 
By contrast, the present study looks at investors not from a market stabil-
ity perspective, but from an intra-company governance perspective. In 
other words, this paper is preoccupied with individual investor protec-
tion, not market stability. 
In addition, some fear that circumvention strategies and abuse at-
tempts will result from the netting of long and short positions. In Hong 
                                                      
 360. Short Selling Regulation, supra note 347, at arts. 5(3)-(4), 6(3)-(4). 
 361. See CESR, supra note 350, at 5. 
 362 . See Jennifer Payne, The Regulation of Short Selling and Its Reform in Europe, 13 
EUROPEAN BUS. ORG. L. REV. 413 (2012). 
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Kong, where a disclosure regime for negative interests was introduced in 
2003, this was one of the main reasons for insisting on a separate disclo-
sure of long and short positions and for not allowing netting between 
both sides.363 Moreover, netted information would be significantly weak-
er in comparison with separate positive and negative messages.364 
What information do shareholders and investors really need? In-
formation on aggregated risk exposure, as required in the Short Selling 
Regulation, does not satisfy the requirements posed by the information 
problem developed in this paper. Instead, this paper advocates for a sepa-
rate (gross) reporting requirement for a negative interest in shares.365 On-
ly when such a disclosure is concurrently applicable with the existing 
regime of positive interests pursuant to the Transparency Directive will 
sufficient information be provided to market players. A few examples 
illustrate this concept. 
Example (a) Hedge fund A holds 7% of the shares in the listed 
company G, which it discloses according to the national law implement-
ing Article 9 of the Transparency Directive. A enters into derivative 
transactions totaling well over 7 per cent of the shares of G, which elimi-
nate its risk in the shares of G completely. Its “net short position” is zero, 
so there is no reporting requirement under the Short Selling Regula-
tion.366 From the corporate governance angle developed in this paper, 
however, it is extremely important for the other shareholders and poten-
tial investors of G to learn about this derivatives business. Mindful of the 
legal and political insights stemming from the perspective of the princi-
pal–agent conflict and cost information, as discussed above, a duty to 
inform the market should be introduced for this scenario. 
Example (b) Hedge fund B owns 1% of the shares in G, which is 
not discoverable under the Transparency Directive. B enters into compa-
rable derivatives transactions in the amount equivalent to 1.5% of the 
shares in G. The net short position of B is -0.5, so this is to be notified 
under the new Short Selling Regulation both to the national regulator and 
to the public.367 But it follows from our reflections above that the reasons 
of risk decoupling would not necessarily require disclosure here. B only 
                                                      
 363. Proposed Amendments to The Securities (Disclosure of Interests) Ordinance – Consulta-
tion Conclusions, SEC. & FUTURES COMM’N 42 (Mar. 1999), http://www.sfc.hk/edistributionWeb/ 
gateway/EN/consultation/conclusion?refNo=98CP4. 
 364. Id. 
 365. See Eumedion, supra note 337, at 9. But see Shareholders.org Response to SEC Concept 
Release on the U.S. Proxy System, File No. S7 1410, at 7 (Oct. 20, 2010). 
 366. See Short Selling Regulation, supra note 347, at arts. 3(4), 5(1). 
 367. Id. at arts. 5(1), 6(1). 
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holds a voting power of 1%, which is too small to have a lasting impact 
on the company’s strategy or to pursue or convene a general meeting. 
In addition, it is possible that netting the two positions can be mis-
leading or ambiguous. Shareholders and investors who learn about such a 
notification would be unaware of how strong B’s influence in G really is. 
There is a noticeable difference between a 0.1% shareholder, who holds 
risk-eliminating derivatives of 0.6%, and a 4.9% shareholder,368 whose 
risk is reduced by 5.4%. Hence, two separate notifications are much 
more informative. 
Example (c) Hedge Fund C holds a 10% stake in G, which it dis-
closes according to the Transparency Directive. C enters into derivatives 
transactions amounting to 5% over shares of G, which reduce its risk to 
that extent, namely, a partial risk elimination. Because C is far from 
reaching a negative “net short position,” a disclosure requirement under 
the Short Selling Regulation is not required, which is consistent from the 
perspective of market stability, as there is no incentive for C to artificial-
ly bring down the share price of G. Given our considerations here, how-
ever, distorted incentives for C’s voting decisions arise. The principal–
agent theory shows that C will not make optimal decisions for the benefit 
of all shareholders and potential investors. Because the distortion is sig-
nificant, comprising five percentage points, the information is crucial to 
shareholders and investors. 
b. Comprehensive Definition 
The Short Selling Regulation intends to comprise of all situations of 
overall prevailing negative interest under the notion of “net short posi-
tion.” This position exists by virtue of Article 3(4) of the regulation: 
“[A]fter deducting any long position that a natural or legal person holds 
in relation to the issued share capital from any short position that that 
natural or legal person holds in relation to that capital.” In turn, Article 
3(1) defines “short position”:  
(a) a short sale of a share issued by a company . . . or (b) entering 
into a transaction which creates or relates to a financial instrument 
other than an instrument referred to in point (a) where the effect or 
                                                      
 368. This would be just under the initial disclosure threshold for long positions according to 
article nine of the Transparency Directive. Most EU member states are following this regime, alt-
hough some have reduced it to 3% or even to2 %. See Report on More Stringent National Measures 
Concerning Directive 2004/109/EC on the Harmonisation of Transparency Requirements in Rela-
tion to Information About Issuers Whose Securities are Admitted to Trading on a Regulated Market, 
SEC (2008) 3033 final, 6. The United States also has a 5% initial threshold. See Securities Exchange 
Act 1934, Pub. L. No. 73–291, § 13(d), 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78j). 
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one of the effects of the transaction is to confer a financial ad-
vantage on the natural or legal person entering into that transaction, 
in the event of a decrease in the price or value of the share or debt 
instrument. 
The term “financial instrument” is broad and defined in EU Market In-
frastructure Directive (MiFID).369 
Nevertheless, it is obvious that the regulation provides for a few 
gaps. Most notably, our cases of share lending or repurchase agreements 
are explicitly not covered by the regulation.370 After all, the disclosure of 
a borrowed share position is extremely controversial and treated very 
differently as between Member States.371 The disclosure regime devel-
oped here therefore needs to find a coherent approach. 
In the quest for the right approach, a law reform in Hong Kong may 
serve as an illustration of a successful integration of the various aspects 
of “negative interest.” Already in 2003, Hong Kong introduced a disclo-
sure regime for short positions of all types, with the aim of capturing the 
economic interests of major shareholders of a company and of making 
these interests more transparent. For this purpose, the revised Securities 
and Futures Ordinance (SFR)372 provides that shareholders whose stake 
exceeds 5% need to disclose if they hold beyond the long position also a 
short position of at least 1% of the share capital of the same issuer.373 
Long and short positions cannot be aggregated, but they must be speci-
fied separately.374 Remarkably, securities borrowing positions are to be 
explicitly included in the calculation of the short position, since section 
308 defines a short position as follows: 
‘short position’ (淡倉) means the position which a person has- 
(a) where the person is the holder, writer or issuer of any equity de-
rivatives, by virtue of which the person- 
(i) has a right to require another person to take delivery of 
the underlying shares of the equity derivatives; 
                                                      
 369. Council Directive 2004/39/EC, annex I, part C, 2004 O.J. (L 145) 1. 
 370. See Short Selling Regulation, supra note 347, at recital 17 & art. 2(1)(b). 
 371. See, e.g., MAZARS & MARCCUS PARTNERS, supra note 47; see also Feedback Statement, 
supra note 321, at 41; cf. Wymeersch, supra note 178. 
 372. Hong Kong, China, Securities & Futures Ordinance, ch. 571, L.N. 12 (2003) [hereinafter 
Securities & Futures Ordinance]. 
 373. Id. at Part XV. 
 374 . See IOSCO TECHNICAL COMM., REPORT ON TRANSPARENCY OF SHORT SELLING 17 
(2003), available at http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD147.pdf. 
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(ii) is under an obligation to deliver the underlying shares 
of the equity derivatives to another person, if called upon to 
do so; 
(iii) has a right to receive from another person an amount if 
the price of the underlying shares of the equity derivatives 
declines; or 
(iv) has a right to avoid or reduce a loss if the price of the 
underlying shares of the equity derivatives declines, 
before or on a certain date or within a certain period, 
whether in any case the right or obligation is conditional or 
absolute; or 
(b) where the person is the borrower of shares under a securities 
borrowing and lending agreement, by virtue of which the person is 
under an obligation to deliver shares to another person who has lent 
shares, if called upon to do so, before or on a certain date or within 
a certain period, whether or not the obligation to deliver shares is to 
be settled by payment of cash or by delivery of shares or other-
wise.375 
Paragraph (a) refers to the various derivatives, whereas paragraph (b) 
determines that the borrower of shares holds a negative position as well. 
According the Securities and Futures Commission (SFC), the Hong 
Kong market regulator, the borrower of securities may acquire a long and 
a short position at the same time, so he may be required to issue a double 
notification.376 A number of exceptions are stipulated.377 
In summary, the different points developed here will be elaborated 
into a concrete legislative proposal further below.378 For now, we can 
summarize that we have identified the need for a: (1) continuous disclo-
sure obligation (2) by existing shareholders, who hold a sizeable long 
position, such as 5% of the voting rights, (3) along with an equally sig-
nificant short position, (4) both positions should not be aggregated but 
disclosed separately, (5) and the definition of a short position needs to 
cover all relevant scenarios, including borrowed securities. 
                                                      
 375. Securities & Futures Ordinance, supra note 372, § 308. 
 376. Sec. & Futures Comm., Outline of Part XV of the Securities and Futures Ordinance (Cap. 
571) – Disclosure of Interests, at para 2.4.2 (Aug. 6, 2003). 
 377. Securities & Futures Ordinance, supra note 372, § 309. 
 378. See infra Part V. 
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D. Disenfranchisement 
A recent and seminal academic article on the modified risk struc-
ture of shares comes to the emphatic conclusion: “Scholars (and legal 
rules) should recognize what is apparent from financial innovation: not 
every share should be entitled to a vote.”379 Similar to the present analy-
sis, this plea is based on the insight that risk-reduced or even risk-
eliminated shareholders have entirely changed interests compared to reg-
ular shareholders, which makes voting for these shares a problem. In this 
context, some scholars have made proposals to deprive risk-decoupled 
shareholders of their voting right. For instance, Henry Hu and Bernard 
Black, in the last of several articles on the subject, propose to withdraw 
the voting right from every shareholder whose risk exposure is negative, 
by simple operation of corporate law.380 However, they leave open the 
question of whether a direct ban or a rebuttable legal presumption should 
be introduced.381 In a similar vein, David Skeel wants to grant courts a 
stronger role in deciding to withdraw the voting entitlement from indi-
vidual shareholders.382 A French working group chaired by Yves Man-
sion, Board Member of the Autorité des Marchés Financiers, also came 
to the conclusion that a statutory loss of the voting right is the most ef-
fective way to combat risk-decoupling strategies.383 Even the so-called 
Hedge Fund Working Group, a self-organization of the sector, indirectly 
suggested limiting the voting rights in target companies to regular share-
holders.384 
1. A General Prohibition to Vote? 
To understand the theoretical underpinnings of this approach, we 
can revert to the considerations discussed above, which draw upon the 
perspective of corporate finance.385 One of the arguments developed—
based on work by Gilson and Whitehead in particular—is that risk-
decoupled shares are in substance closer to debt than to equity.386 Volatil-
                                                      
 379. Martin & Partnoy, supra note 24, at 813. 
 380. Hu & Black, supra note 24, at 701. 
 381. Id. at 702. 
 382. David Skeel, Behind the Hedge, 11/12 LEGAL AFF., 2005, at 28. 
 383. AMF, supra note 300, at 13. 
 384. HEDGE FUND WORKING GRP., HEDGE FUND STANDARDS CONSULTATION PAPER PART 2: 
THE BEST PRACTICE STANDARDS 61 (2007); see also Press Release, Hedge Fund Working Grp., 
supra note 246. 
 385. See supra Part IV.C.3. 
 386. Ronald J. Gilson & Charles Whitehead, Deconstructing Equity: Public Ownership, Agen-
cy Costs, and Complete Capital Markets, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 231, 251 (2008); see supra Part 
IV.C.3. 
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ity risk is characteristic of equity investors, and for that very reason these 
investors are granted the right to vote. In the absence of this risk, it is 
logical to conclude that the vote must be omitted. 
In various jurisdictions, the legal reality corresponds to this ra-
tionale. The Second Company Law Directive, for example, introduced 
into all EU member states’ company law the rule that the company itself 
cannot exercise the voting right in its own shares.387 In a similar vein, the 
English law on schemes of arrangement recognizes the principle that the 
exercise of a right to vote requires an economic interest in the outcome 
of the vote, which is settled case law.388 German law, moreover, recog-
nizes prohibitions to vote in cases where votes are bought or otherwise 
abusively used.389 All of these instances have in common the legal prin-
ciple that a voting entitlement should only be attributed to those share-
holders who have a real risk exposure in the shares. 
The key question, then, is whether it is overall desirable to respond 
to our risk-decoupling analysis with a prohibition to vote. As a starting 
point, it should be noted that a voting ban is certainly a suitable instru-
ment to prevent the above-described undesirable and cost-creating effects 
of risk-decoupling conduct. The exercise of voting rights, where risk is 
eliminated or reduced, has been identified above as the main problem, 
even if shareholders can exercise informal pressure on the administration 
as an addition to the formal voting process at the general meeting. 
Doubts arise from other quarters, however, chiefly related to similar 
delimitation problems that have emerged from discussions over a possi-
ble ban on risk-decoupling structures altogether.390 Just like a prohibi-
tion, a disenfranchisement rule is a “black and white” instrument, which 
offers two options: either the shareholder is disenfranchised, or he is not 
disenfranchised. Accordingly, no room for a “grey” solution remains, 
which might be desirable in a partly risk-reduced situation, for example. 
An automatic deprivation of the right to vote will therefore often yield 
inappropriate results. 
                                                      
 387. Second Directive 77/91/EEC, art. 22(1), § 2 (Feb. 2010) (“Where the laws of a Member 
State permit a company to acquire its own shares, either itself or through a person acting in his own 
name but on the company’s behalf, they shall make the holding of these shares at all times subject to 
at least the following conditions: (a) among the rights attaching to the shares, the right to vote attach-
ing to the company’s own shares shall in any event be suspended.”); see also European Corp. Gov-
ernance Forum, supra note 316. 
 388. Bluebrook Ltd., [2009] EWHC 2114 (Ch.) (U.K.); see also In re Tea Corp., [1904] 1 Ch. 
12 (U.K.). On this more generally, see GULLIFER & PAYNE, supra note 208, at 639. 
 389. Aktiengesetz [AktG] §§ 136, 405. 
 390. See supra Part V.C.2. 
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In addition, as described above, a reduced risk position may also 
produce positive effects, which can be subject to elimination through 
imposing a voting ban. With this, I refer to above-described activist 
shareholders who may obtain additional voting power to effectively 
monitor the management.391 Individual shareholders are given a way to 
exercise additional influence—a possibility to overcome a normalized 
state of “rational apathy.” Again, an automatic prohibition or an automat-
ic voting ban would go too far and would restrict this certainly desirable 
situation. 
Finally, we must recognize that the loss of a voting right is a far-
going intervention and an extensive interference with the membership 
rights of shareholders, which should be limited to exceptional cases. 
Such a rule could also affect the guarantee of property in the European 
Convention of Human Rights and, more generally, the principle of pro-
portionality. 
2. Case-by-Case Decision by Regulator 
The discussion presented here can serve as a guide to developing an 
ideal response to the problem at issue here, which would not be as re-
strictive as an outright disenfranchisement. If a general voting ban goes 
too far such that individual situations are not adequately taken into ac-
count, the voting restriction should be designed in a way that it can be 
imposed in each individual case. This power could be given, for exam-
ple, to national market supervisors such as BaFin in Germany or the FSA 
in the United Kingdom. The role of a national regulator would draw on 
the transparency regime developed in this paper and complete it. The 
following key points outline the benefits of these powers conferred on a 
regulator: 
(1) Any intervention of a national regulator requires the regulating 
body to become aware of all potentially relevant facts. In this 
respect, transparency and voting prohibition could be said to go 
hand-in-hand: the above-developed disclosure regime392 would 
supply the regulator with the information on the basis of which 
an intervention may be initiated. 
(2) Furthermore, a voting restriction that can be imposed in an in-
dividual situation covering an otherwise open gap of legal pro-
tection that remains even after the introduction of a comprehen-
sive disclosure system. Despite the potential deterrent effect of 
                                                      
 391. See supra Part IV.A.2. 
 392. See supra Part V.C.3. 
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a transparency obligation, it is still possible for some investors 
to surprise shareholders by using a well-timed stake building 
strategy. If, for example, a hedge fund reveals a risk-decoupling 
structure during the last possible moment before the record 
date, the rest of the shareholders are no longer able to react ac-
cordingly. It is inherent in the record date system that shifts af-
ter the record date will no longer affect the voting entitle-
ment. 393  Therefore, counter-alliances cannot be effectively 
formed and counter-proposals or counter-strategies cannot be 
formulated and put on the agenda. In this respect, depriving the 
voting right would be the only viable option. 
(3) In comparison with a general statutory scheme, the greatest ad-
vantage of a system where the regulator is responsible for indi-
vidual decisions is that these decisions can account for the indi-
vidual facts of the situation. The regulator may in particular 
consider: 
i. the actual scope and extent of the risk-decoupling sit-
uation, in particular the extent of the voting rights 
owned by the investor and the risk reduced; 
ii. the timing of the situation, for example, how close to a 
general meeting or other decision the risk decoupling 
occurs—depending on the result, the regulator may as-
sess how much time remains for the market to develop 
independent solutions, be it counter alliances, counter 
proposals, management action, etcetera; 
iii. the potential harm of the risk-decoupled situation. The 
regulator will want to analyze whether the initiative 
was created for good reasons and in good faith, so as to 
for example to control management for the benefit of 
all shareholders, to assess whether the risk-decoupled 
shareholders are likely to pursue only their own inter-
ests. 
It becomes clear from the points discussed that the power to regulate a 
voting ban in individual cases complements the transparency regime and 
offers enforcement through real sanctions. Again, the hope is that the 
mere possibility of issuing a ban is enough of a deterrence to using risk 
decoupling in the first place. 
Finally, the path suggested here—to equip the regulator with the 
power of withdrawing the voting right—would harmonize the currently 
                                                      
 393. See supra Part III.C. 
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proposed reform of the Transparency Directive on “long positions.”394 
Striving to further harmonize the sanctions in the Directive, the Commis-
sion proposes to introduce new article 28a into the Transparency Di-
rective, which stipulates that national supervisory authorities are, inter 
alia, empowered to “suspend the exercise of voting rights attached to 
shares admitted to trading on a regulated market if the competent au-
thority finds that the provisions of this Directive, concerning notification 
of major holdings have been infringed by the holder of shares or other 
financial instruments.”395 In this regard, the Commission is focusing on 
an area that has not been subject to harmonization thus far; it is based on 
the Commission Communication on “[r]einforcing sanctioning regimes 
in the financial services sector.”396 In favor of the power to suspend vot-
ing rights, the Commission submits that the sanctions could prevent vio-
lations of transparency requirements in the most effective way. 397  It 
seems that a coherent legal system should have corresponding sanctions 
for both positive and negative interests in securities. In this respect, the 
solution proposed here would harmonize well with the Commission’s 
present efforts. 
By contrast, the elimination of other shareholder rights, such as the 
right to dividends, would appear to be unnecessary. The main economic 
problem that is addressed here results from an exercise of the voting 
right, and not the dividend right or other rights. An extension of the regu-
lator’s powers to suspending other shareholder rights would therefore be 
disproportionate. 
In sum, a regulator’s well-defined power of suspending the voting 
right—targeting risk-decoupled shareholders in individual situations—
seems to accompany the developed disclosure system well. Together, 
                                                      
 394. Commission Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 
Amending Directive 2004/109/EC on the Harmonisation of Transparency Requirements in Relation 
to Information About Issuers Whose Securities are Admitted to Trading on a Regulated Market and 
Commission Directive 2007/14/EC, COM (2011) 683, art. 1(8)(b) (Oct. 25, 2011) [hereinafter Com-
mission Proposal for a Directive]. 
 395. Id. at art. 1(16). 
 396. Commission Communication of 8 December 2010 on Reinforcing Sanctioning Regimes in 
the Financial Services Sector, COM (2010) 716. 
 397. Commission Proposal for a Directive, supra note 394, at 9 (“[T]he competent authorities 
in the Member States should have the power to suspend the exercise of voting rights of the issuer 
who had breached the notification rules on major holdings, as this is the most efficient sanction to 
prevent a breach of these rules. In order to ensure consistent application of sanctions, uniform crite-
ria should be set for determining the actual sanction applicable to a person or a company.”); see also 
Commission Staff Working Paper Executive Summary of the Impact Statement, SEC (2011) 1279, 
at 41. 
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these two components build a helpful combination that can address all 
problematic situations that arise. 
E. A Concrete Proposal 
The analysis thus far has led to the following conclusions: the best 
regulatory response to the phenomenon of risk decoupling would be a 
combination of (1) disclosing negative positions in shares, and (2) allow-
ing regulators to suspend voting rights in individual cases. 
Given the arguments put forth in this Article, a new system is pre-
scribed to meet the policy considerations discussed. The key solution 
advanced here for the problem of risk decoupling is based on an integrat-
ed disclosure system for a negative interest in shares. The basic idea is 
that shareholders and investors should be informed about (1) significant 
short positions and (2) existing (long) shareholders. Therefore, the defi-
nition of the “short” position is crucial. 
Accordingly, the following new article, to be inserted into the 
Transparency Directive, is suggested here: 
Article 10a. Notification of risk-modifying agreements. 
(1) The home Member State shall ensure that where a shareholder is 
obliged to notify according to Article 9, such a shareholder notifies 
the issuer of any agreement, arrangement or mutual consent, the aim 
or effect of which is to modify the shareholder’s risk structure with 
respect to the issuer, provided that this agreement refers to at least 5 
percent of the voting rights of the same issuer. In particular, this in-
cludes but is not limited to arrangements to reduce the shareholder’s 
risk structure, to benefit from share price changes, or to modify the 
voting power of the shareholder. The same notification obligation 
shall apply to the obligation or intent to transfer shares within a 
specified time period to another person. 
(2) The same notification obligation shall apply to any subsequent 
modification to the agreement. 
(3) The notification to the issuer shall be effected as soon as possi-
ble, but not later than three trading days, the first of which shall be 
the day after the date on which the shareholder 
(a) learns of the acquisition or disposal or of the possibility 
of exercising voting rights, or on which, having regard to 
the circumstances, should have learned of it, regardless of 
the date on which the acquisition, disposal or possibility of 
exercising voting rights takes effect; or 
(b) enters into the agreement mentioned in paragraph (1). 
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(4) Upon receipt of the notification under paragraphs 1 or 2, but no 
later than three trading days thereafter, the issuer shall make public 
all the information contained in the notification. 
(5) A home Member State may exempt issuers from the requirement 
in paragraph 3 if the information contained in the notification is 
made public by its competent authority upon receipt of the notifica-
tion, but no later than three trading days thereafter. 
(6) The Commission shall, in accordance with the procedure re-
ferred to in Article 27(2), adopt implementing measures in order to 
take account of technical developments on financial markets and to 
ensure the uniform application of paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article. 
As to the power to disenfranchise shareholders in individual situations, I 
suggest the following wording: 
Article 10b. Sanctions. 
(1) Without prejudice to the supervisory powers of competent au-
thorities under this Directive or under national law, Member States 
shall ensure that in the situations referred to Article 10a, administra-
tive sanctions and measures that can be applied include at least the 
power to suspend the exercise of voting rights attached to shares 
admitted to trading on a regulated market, if the competent authority 
finds that disclosure is not sufficient to address the problems result-
ing from the risk-modifying agreement. 
(2) In assessing this, the competent authority shall have regard, inter 
alia, to 
(a) scope and extent of the risk-decoupling situation, in par-
ticular the amount of voting rights notified under Article 9, 
the extent of the risk-modifying agreements notified under 
Article 10a, and the relationship between these two notifi-
cations; 
(b) the urgency of the situation, in particular how close to a 
general meeting the notification under Article 10a was 
made; 
(c) the intentions of the shareholder making the notification 
under Article 10a. 
These two proposals are underpinned by the reasoning developed 
above.398 To reiterate, they ensure that disclosure is the first and most 
important means to address risk-decoupling structures. A continuous dis-
                                                      
 398. See supra Parts V.C.3, C.4. 
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closure obligation addresses most of the concerns developed in Part IV 
above. In order to reduce the disruptive effects on the market, a relatively 
high threshold (of 5%) is appropriate; with a lower threshold, a company 
may not feel compelled to change its strategy. The disclosure obligation 
does not aggregate short and long positions, but rather mandates a sepa-
rated disclosure. The definition of a “short position” intends to cover all 
relevant scenarios, including borrowed securities. 
The disclosure obligation is accompanied by a sanctioning regime 
with which European regulators should be equipped. The regime can be 
understood to close those loopholes against legal protection that may 
remain. In contrast to a general statutory voting restriction, the regime 
can take into account the specific aspects of each individual situation. 
For further details, I refer to the elaborated discussion above.399 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Activist hedge funds often employ the strategy of risk decoupling. 
Regulators worldwide are rightly on alert because risk decoupling creates 
strong policy concerns. This Article has looked at the phenomenon from 
three different policy perspectives—agency costs, information and trans-
action costs, and corporate finance theory. In essence, negative risk de-
coupling deviates from traditional assumptions of corporate governance 
and finance as it creates agency and information costs, both for internal 
shareholders and external investors alike. On the other hand, risk decou-
pling may mitigate shareholder coordination problems in individual cases 
by allowing for the transfer of votes from less informed to specialized, 
active shareholders. 
The remedy proposed in this Article addresses both aspects. The 
preferable approach would be to adopt a comprehensive disclosure sys-
tem for negative positions. Care should be taken to ensure that disclosure 
is meaningful and not overly burdensome. Therefore, there should be a 
relatively high initial disclosure threshold. By contrast, the requirement 
of reporting gross positions (rather than netted long and short positions) 
ensures that the market can clearly distinguish between the shareholder’s 
voting influence in the company and the shareholder’s economic expo-
sure. The high initial threshold ensures that only those positions need be 
disclosed where an influence on the company’s strategy seems likely. 
Moreover, daily lending activity or derivatives trading will be left un-
touched, avoiding a disruptive impact on the market. Based on these con-
siderations, I developed a concrete legislative proposal to amend the Eu-
                                                      
 399. See supra Parts V.C.3, C.4. 
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ropean Transparency Directive. Similar considerations would apply to 
other jurisdictions. 
The disclosure of negative decoupling situations should allow the 
market to respond adequately, and it will also strongly deter harmful de-
coupling activity. For the few situations where the market is unable to 
react, national regulators should be equipped with the power to suspend 
decoupled shareholders’ voting rights. This is preferable over a blanket 
disenfranchisement rule as regulators can assess the facts of the individu-
al situation. Clear guidance criteria are provided. 
The concrete proposals made in this Article are pitched to the Eu-
ropean market. However, the policy considerations and the reasoning 
behind the regulatory tools should hold true for any jurisdiction in the 
world. The SEC, for example, is also considering imposing new regula-
tory action.400 It is the author’s hope that the present study will encourage 
worldwide thinking about the phenomenon. 
 
                                                      
 400. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, R34-62495, IA-3052, IC-29340, File No. S7-14-10, CONCEPT 
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